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Article

Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement
Alan L. Durham†
In 2006 the Supreme Court granted certiorari1 and then
dismissed it as improvidently granted in Laboratory Corp. of
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.2 (LabCorp).
The plaintiff’s patent claimed a method of diagnosing a vitamin
deficiency by observing the level of the amino acid homocysteine in a patient’s blood.3 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the dismissal and voiced his
concern that the patent violated the long-standing rule that
principles of nature are unpatentable.4 The rule holds that
scientists who contribute to our understanding of nature, adding to the sum of knowledge but nothing more, cannot secure
the property rights that convert insight into wealth.5 Patents
encourage technical achievements through the promise of reward, but natural phenomena and principles of nature per se
exceed the scope of patentable subject matter.6 Only those who
apply their understanding in the form of new structures, compounds, or processes may secure a patent,7 and with the patent
† Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. J.D. 1988,
University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Dean Kenneth Randall and the University of Alabama Law School Foundation for their support
of this research. Thanks also to Creighton Miller and Penny Gibson of the Law
School Library for their tireless assistance in locating source materials. Copyright © 2008 by Alan L. Durham.
1. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 601,
601 (2005) (mem.) (granting certiorari limited to a single question).
2. 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (per curium) (mem.).
3. Id. at 2921 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 2926–27.
5. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948) (“[These discoveries] are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none.”).
6. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
7. Id. at 187–88; see Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 (linking invention to the
development of an application for “a new and useful end”); see also 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2000) (granting patents to “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
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the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the fruits of their discoveries.8 In short, where patents are concerned it is better to be
an Edison than an Einstein.
Justice Breyer’s LabCorp opinion, while inconclusive, highlights a kind of invention that lies in the netherworld between
natural principles and the practical application of those principles—an invention that relies upon observation, reasoning,
and a newly discovered natural relationship. The patent did not
claim the relationship between homocysteine and vitamin deficiencies as such; the patent claimed a method of diagnosis9—a
method potentially new and useful, and a product of human ingenuity. Nevertheless, Justice Breyer included the method
within the traditional prohibition against patenting nature.
Laws of nature, Justice Breyer reminded, are the “basic tools”
of research, so fundamental to technological progress that to
grant exclusive rights to those tools would have the effect of
stifling, rather than promoting, advancements in the useful
arts.10 The homocysteine relationship may be one of those “basic tools,” but the patent claimed only the use of the relationship, as many other patents claim the use of natural phenomena for practical ends.11 Is a method of diagnosis really a
foundation for further research? If so, how can it be distinguished from a novel measurement apparatus, where the potential of the invention as a research tool raises no barrier to
patentability? Something in the traditional dichotomy between
principle and application breaks down in Justice Breyer’s analysis.
What is different and dangerous about the LabCorp patent
is not its potential for hindering fundamental research but the
role of knowledge in distinguishing those who infringe. An ignorant physician does not observe the forbidden correlation. An
informed physician, reading a lab report, cannot avoid it. This
has two consequences. First, it discourages the spread of knowledge by penalizing those who receive it. Second, the potentially
involuntary nature of the infringement threatens to broaden
the patentee’s market power beyond the intended limits of the
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”).
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (defining infringement as making, using,
selling, offering to sell, or importing a patented invention without the patent
owner’s authority).
9. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2924 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
10. See id. at 2922–23.
11. See id. at 2924, 2927.
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grant. An unlicensed physician might be forced to abandon legitimate activity—like performing blood tests for other purposes—simply to avoid unintended infringement. These are serious concerns and should be the focus of inquiry for patents
based on observation and analysis. While the traditional rules
governing the patentability of natural laws and phenomena are
useful in other contexts, in this instance they fail to separate
the harmless sheep from the economically menacing wolves.
Part I of this Article examines the long-standing prohibition against patenting natural laws and natural phenomena
per se. Part II discusses the special case of inventions based on
observation and analysis of natural phenomena and critiques
Justice Breyer’s LabCorp opinion. Here, several threads converge, including disputed definitions of “process,”12 the tortuous
history of the “mental steps” doctrine,13 and conflicting ideas
about the interaction between patentable subject matter and
novelty. Part III discusses the economic spill-over effects of patents based on observing nature and suggests that these effects, rather than the issues discussed in Parts I and II, are the
key to identifying the patents that may do serious harm. A patent that grants market power beyond the inventive contribution of the patentee imposes unjustified costs.14 It takes from
the public without corresponding benefit. This, in the end, is a
more serious concern than whether a patent embraces a law of
nature or a tool of research.
I. NATURAL LAWS AND PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Article I of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”15
This directive to promote the “useful Arts” is the source of Congress’s authority to issue patents. “Useful arts” is an eighteenth-century term for what today we would call “technology.”16 Patents encourage the development of technology by
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 1419, 1437–44 (1999); Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50,
54 (1949) (“The term ‘useful arts’ as used in the Constitution and in the titles
of the patent statutes is best represented in modern language by the word
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allowing inventors exclusive rights to their discoveries for a period ending twenty years after the filing date of the patent application.17 Although the Constitution refers to “science,” historians conclude that the Framers meant knowledge of all kinds,
rather than the narrower field to which we apply the term
“science” today.18 The balanced structure of the clause links
“science” with “authors” and their “writings”—the province of
copyright law, not patent law.19 Hence patent law concerns itself not with scientific inquiry, as some jurists have mistakenly
believed,20 but with the useful arts—knowledge, scientific or
otherwise, applied in practical ways for the benefit of humanity.21
An invention may be patented only if it is novel and “nonobvious” in comparison to the “prior art” inventions that preceded it.22 It must also be useful: it must provide some practical
benefit, even if it is not superior to existing alternatives.23 An
inventor must describe the patented invention in a series of
claims, and those claims must be definite enough to inform others skilled in the art of the metes and bounds of the patentee’s
exclusive rights.24
Perhaps the most basic requirement of a patentable invention is that it must fall within the bounds of patentable subject
matter, defined in § 101 of the Patent Act.25 Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
‘technology.’”).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
18. See Lutz, supra note 16, at 51–55.
19. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL
ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1787–1836, at 60–61
(1998) (citing RICHARD C. DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 15
(1925)); Lutz, supra note 16, at 51 (citing DE WOLF, supra).
20. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147, 154–58 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
21. See generally WALTERSCHEID, supra note 19, at 19 (“[T]he intellectual
property clause clearly encompassed two separate powers packaged together;
one to promote the progress of science . . . through the exclusive grant known
as a copyright, and the other to promote the useful arts through the exclusive
grant known as a patent.”).
22. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2000 & Supp. 2006); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of
Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1965)).
23. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387,
1390 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); see All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental
Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779–80 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.”26 Patentable subject matter under § 101 may be narrower
in scope than the Constitution’s general reference to “discoveries,” but it is nevertheless exceedingly broad.27 As the Supreme Court observed in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,28 where it
found living things created in the laboratory to be within the
scope of patentable subject matter, “[i]n choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”29
Indeed, the Committee Reports suggest that the § 101 subject
matter of patents could “include anything under the sun that is
made by man.”30
Notwithstanding the general expansiveness of § 101, courts
have identified certain discoveries that lie beyond its scope, including laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas.31 These exceptions, rooted in more than 150 years of patent-law jurisprudence, resist precise definition. The difficulty
stems from the close relationship between understanding the
workings of the natural world and applying them in useful
ways. The scope of a patent should correspond, as nearly as
possible, to the inventor’s contribution to society.32 Moreover, if
the goal of the patent system is to enhance public welfare by
promoting technological advancement,33 the rights conferred
26. Id. Versions of the Patent Act before 1952 employed similar language,
but used the term “art” in place of “process.” See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980). The change is not substantive, and “art” maintains a
presence in the definition of “process” as a “process, art or method.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(b) (2000).
27. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124,
130 (2001).
28. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
29. Id. at 308.
30. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2398–99; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). Senate Report 82-1979 repeats in
substance House Report 82-1923. 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2394.
31. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (listing cases).
32. See generally Robin C. Feldman, The Inventor’s Contribution, 2005
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6, 6 (“In exchange for the sphere of rights conferred with
the patent, society requires inventors to reveal their inventions. The disclosure
requirement is frequently described as the quid pro quo, the inventor’s contribution [to society] in exchange for the powerful patent grant.”).
33. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307 (“The authority of Congress is exercised in the hope that ‘[the] productive effort thereby fostered will have a posi-
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must be broad enough to provide the necessary incentives, but
not so broad that they deny the public the benefit of new technologies or discourage further innovation.34 This balancing act
accounts for many of the problematic distinctions in patent
law,35 and it sparked debate in some of the earliest cases dealing with the patentability of inventions based on natural principles.36
A. NATURAL LAWS IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF INVENTION
Modern cases on natural laws and patentable subject matter still cite a number of nineteenth-century opinions, some involving such illustrious inventors as Samuel Morse and Alexander Graham Bell.37 Few question now, or questioned then,
the importance of the contributions made by those inventors.
But patent claims, by their nature, do not confer rights to specific items (e.g., Morse’s telegraph apparatus in all of its concrete detail) but rather to classes of items (e.g., any telegraph
one might construct, if it includes elements corresponding to
each element listed in the claim). A claim limited to Morse’s
own mechanism could have been avoided by minor changes.38 A
valuable claim, and one corresponding to Morse’s insights,
must generalize to some extent, including what is new and useful in Morse’s telegraph, but omitting what is nonessential.39
The questions raised in these early cases concern the extent to
tive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.’” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974))).
34. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“[A]ll patents are capable of discouraging at least some innovation . . . . This discouragement, however, is simply
part of the cost that the public bears to promote an overall patent system
whose goal is to motivate more innovation than it deters.”).
35. An example of such a problematic distinction is the scope of patent
claims under the “doctrine of equivalents.” A literal reading of patent claims
would expose patentees to minor variations that rob them of their monetary
reward; on the other hand, disregarding claim limitations may stifle innovation through uncertainty. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–33 (2002).
36. See discussion infra Part I.A.
37. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854) (Samuel Morse);
The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1887) (Alexander Graham Bell).
38. See generally Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1854)
(“The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at
liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions.”).
39. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 734–44 (discussing the importance of the inventor’s choice to use broad or narrow language in describing the claim).
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which patent claims can generalize, and whether they can do so
by reference to the natural law on which the invention relies.
In 1852 the Supreme Court discussed whether one could
patent a “principle” in Le Roy v. Tatham.40 The patentee discovered that sections of lead pipe could be securely joined if
forced together, using conventional machinery, under extreme
pressure and heat.41 Rather than claiming the novel method as
such, the patentee claimed the machinery when used in the
manner described.42 Discovering a new use for an existing apparatus does not permit one to patent the apparatus, so the
manner in which the patentee characterized the invention
proved fatal.43 The trial judge had emphasized the new “principle” at work, however, and the Court offered some observations on that point.44 While cautioning that the word “principle”
had been used by courts and scholars with such imprecision
that it was likely to mislead,45 the Court explained that principles, as such, cannot be patented:
A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause;
a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of
them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new
power, should one be discovered in addition to those already known.
Through the agency of machinery a new steam power may be said to
have been generated. But no one can appropriate this power exclusively to himself, under the patent laws. The same may be said of
electricity, and of any other power in nature, which is alike open to
all, and may be applied to useful purposes by the use of machinery.46

Invention lies not in the discovery of natural principles, but
in devising ways to apply those principles to practical ends.47
Only the latter are patentable.48 Moreover, an inventor may not
generalize an invention so far as to claim any means of producing the desired effect.49 A monopoly of such scope “would discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy of

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1853).
See id. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 176–77.
Id. at 174–75.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 174–75.
Id. at 175.
Id.
Id.
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the patent laws.”50 One must leave room for others to devise
new ways to achieve similar results.51
One year later, the Supreme Court covered some of the
same ground in O’Reilly v. Morse.52 The eighth claim of Morse’s
telegraph patent embraced any use of electromagnetism, then
known or later developed, for transmitting written characters.53
The majority rejected Morse’s claim as too broad.54 Anticipating
further developments in the field of communications, the Court
observed that “[f]or aught that we now know some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of
writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification.”55 The discovery
of a subsequent inventor might improve on Morse, but if
Morse’s claim were upheld the inventor of the improvement
would need Morse’s permission to proceed.56 Like the inventor
in Le Roy, Morse had to confine himself to the means he had
devised for harnessing electromagnetism, because policy would
not tolerate a patent limited only by the effect he had
achieved.57
Justice Grier supplied the dissent. “The mere discovery,”
he wrote, “of a new element, or law, or principle of nature,
without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the subject of a patent.”58 However, “he who takes this new element or
power, as yet useless, from the laboratory of the philosopher,
and makes it the servant of man; who applies it to the perfecting of a new and useful art . . . is the benefactor to whom the
50. Id.
51. Id. at 175–76. In dissent, Justice Nelson argued that the patentee had
discovered a new and valuable “property of lead.” Id. at 178 (Nelson, J., dissenting). The patentee did not claim the property as such, but a mode of applying that property to produce superior manufactures. Id. at 178–79. Under this
analysis, although a principle could not be patented in the abstract, a practical
application of a principle could be; unless the patentee had “tied himself down”
to the particulars of the mode he employed, the patentee should be entitled to
claim “all modes by which the same result is produced, by an application of the
same law of nature or property of matter.” Id. at 186.
52. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120–21 (1854).
53. Id. at 112.
54. Id. at 113.
55. Id. The “specification” is the part of a patent including a detailed disclosure of the inventor’s preferred embodiments. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE § 3.3 (2d ed. 2004).
56. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113.
57. Id. at 119.
58. Id. at 132 (Grier, J., dissenting on the question of costs).
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patent law tenders its protection.”59 One who discovers how a
law of nature can be put to work is “a discoverer and inventor
of the highest class,” who may have invested “more labor, expense, persevering industry, and ingenuity than the inventor of
any machine.”60 Regarding the application of the claim to improvements which might themselves be patentable, Grier did
not find that this effect had interfered with the development of
machines and found no reason to fear the effect as applied to
“arts.”61
Although the Court rejected patent claims as broad as
Morse’s claim 8, it did not altogether prohibit inventors from
generalizing, or seeking to capture what Morse called the “essence” of the invention.62 The Court cited with approval Neilson
v. Harford,63 an English case concerning an improved furnace.64
Neilson discovered that a furnace would operate more efficiently if the air used for combustion were preheated.65 In order to
take advantage of this principle, Neilson invented, and patented, a “hot-blast” furnace including an air-heating receptacle
located between the blowing apparatus and the combustion
chamber.66 The court did not force Neilson to limit his claims to
a heating receptacle of the same size, shape, or materials as the
one he had devised; any competent workman could fashion a
suitable receptacle, and the effect would be similar whatever
the variations in the apparatus.67 Admitting that the court
found it difficult to distinguish Neilson’s patent from “a patent
for a principle,” it concluded that the invention claimed was a
machine for applying the principle, even if the patent did not
limit Neilson’s rights to precisely the apparatus he had described.68 The United States Supreme Court, recalling the Neilson case, observed that the inventor could not have patented
the discovery that hot air produced superior combustion, because “the discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or
physical science, is not patentable.”69 But what Neilson had in59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 132–33.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 133–34.
See id. at 114–15 (majority opinion).
Neilson v. Hartford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1266 (Exch.).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1273–74.
Id. at 1273.
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1854).

942

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:933

vented was a mechanism for applying that principle to an improved furnace by interposing a heating receptacle between the
blower and the combustion chamber.70 Whoever used such a
vessel used Neilson’s invention and achieved the same results,
to some extent, regardless of the size or shape of the receptacle.71 In contrast, Morse had not discovered that electromagnetism would successfully transmit characters at a distance in
all cases. His patent must be limited to what he had discovered—a particular method of harnessing electromagnetism to
produce the sought-after result.72
Both Neilson and Morse are notable for commingling what
could be considered separate issues: first, whether the patent
claims eligible subject matter (the application of a natural principle rather than the principle in the abstract); and second,
whether the patent, if enforced, would be unacceptably broad,
failing to correspond with what the inventor had discovered
and inhibiting the efforts of subsequent innovators. Although
there are means today to deal with overbroad claims that do
not rely on patentable subject matter,73 the early conceptual
link between breadth and subject matter has never been broken.74
B. ENDURING PRINCIPLES
The early cases laid the foundation for a number of enduring principles concerning the relationship of natural phenomena and patentable inventions. These may be summarized as the
following: (1) natural laws, in the abstract, cannot be patented;75 (2) natural phenomena, in their natural state, cannot

70. Id.
71. Id. at 116–17.
72. Id. at 117.
73. Alternative means include the requirements that the patent specification describe the patented invention and enable its practice. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (2000); see also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he applicant’s specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed.
Cir. 2003))); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“[The written description requirement] guards against the inventor’s overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to be encompassed within his original creation.”
(citing Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981))).
74. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972).
75. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
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be patented;76 (3) scientific explanations for phenomena already
in use cannot be patented;77 and (4) inventions incorporating
natural principles or phenomena, or based on new understandings of natural law, may be patented.78
1. Natural Laws in the Abstract
Computer software—a product of human ingenuity that is
useful, valuable, but inherently intangible—accounts for many
of the modern cases dealing with the limits of patentable subject matter.79 The Supreme Court’s contribution to this evolving
body of law is largely through the trilogy consisting of Gottschalk v. Benson,80 Parker v. Flook,81 and Diamond v. Diehr.82
Each of these cases supports the venerable rule that natural
laws cannot be patented in the abstract.
The patent applicant in Benson devised a series of mathematical steps (an “algorithm”) for converting one form of numerical representation (binary-coded decimal) into another
form (pure binary).83 Although Benson clearly intended to apply the mathematics in a programming context,84 the claims
did not limit him to any specific computer hardware or any particular use of the technique.85 In a cryptic opinion, the Court rejected the claims as unpatentable subject matter.86 Three concerns dominate the Court’s discussion. First, the claims were
“abstract”87 because they were not tied to any tangible process
or machinery.88 “[A]bstract intellectual concepts,” the Court
76. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
77. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373
(1996).
78. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 1946).
79. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d. 1352, 1356–
58 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting attempts by various courts to adapt naturalphenomena principles to computer technology).
80. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
81. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
82. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
83. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64–65.
84. See id. at 65 (“The patent sought is on a method of programming a
general-purpose digital computer . . . .”).
85. Id. at 64.
86. Id. at 73.
87. See id. at 68 (characterizing the applicant’s claims as “abstract and
sweeping”).
88. See id. (noting that the applicant’s process might “be performed
through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any
apparatus”). The cryptic aspects of the opinion include the nearly contradictory statements on whether a patentable “process” must involve a physical
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held, “are not patentable.”89 Second, because the claims were
abstract, they were also exceedingly broad, covering every use
of the algorithm that had been or might later be discovered.90 If
a patent were allowed, it would “wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula.”91 Third, although the Court did not explicitly
characterize mathematics as a manifestation of nature, the
Court’s seamless transition from discussing natural phenomena to Benson’s algorithm suggests that point of view.92 “Phenomena of nature,” wrote the Court, “though just discovered . . .
are not patentable . . . .”93 Echoing decisions of the previous
century,94 Benson concludes with the ambiguous warning that
“one may not patent an idea.”95
In Flook, the second case of the trilogy, natural law played
a more obvious role. The invention concerned the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons, a process requiring careful monitoring
of temperature, pressure, and other conditions.96 Problems
arise when those conditions exceed certain limits, known as
“alarm limits.”97 Flook’s idea was to update the alarm limits as
the reaction took place, to account for the dynamic nature of
the process.98 His claims described a sequence of taking measurements, calculating new alarm limits using the measured
values, and updating the alarm limits to reflect the calculatransformation. Id. at 64, 68.
89. Id. at 67.
90. Id. at 68 (“Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and sweeping as to
cover both known and unknown uses of the [algorithm]. The end use may [ ]
vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to researching the law books for precedents . . . .”).
91. Id. at 72.
92. See id. at 67–68 (“He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon
of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. . . . We
dealt there [Funk Bros.] with a ‘product’ claim, while the present case deals
with a ‘process’ claim. But we think the same principle applies.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Flook, the Court interpreted Benson as treating a mathematical formula or algorithm “like a law of nature.”
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (emphasis added).
93. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
94. See, e.g., Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507
(1874) (“An idea of itself is not patentable . . . .”).
95. 409 U.S. at 71. The warning is ambiguous because every patent claim
expresses an idea. In Rubber-Tip Pencil, the idea was that one could attach a
rubber eraser to the end of a pencil. In spite of its practical application, the
Court reduced the invention to an “idea” about the natural ability of rubber to
adhere—an idea that was useful but not novel. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507.
96. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585–86.
97. Id. at 585.
98. See id.
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tions.99 The only thing that distinguished Flook’s invention
from the prior art was the computer-implemented mathematical algorithm used to calculate the new figures.100 Flook’s invention differed from Benson’s in important respects. Flook limited his claims to a particular field of use,101 and his
invention was not as abstract as Benson’s, linked as it was to a
physical process. Nevertheless, the Court rejected Flook’s patent as outside the scope of § 101.102
Although Flook claimed a “process” in the general sense of
the term, the Court fell back on the dictate of Le Roy that “[a]
principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth [and] . . . cannot be patented . . . .”103 While “[t]he line between a patentable
‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear,”104
Flook’s invention fell on the side of “principle.” The Court
treated the mathematical formula as though it were already
known, an approach suggested by Neilson v. Harford105 for ignoring the principle itself in order to determine if the applicant
had invented an application of the principle.106 Because the
catalytic conversion process was already known, and the Court
treated the formula as though it too were already known, the
combination was “comparable to a claim that the formula 2πr
can be usefully applied in determining the circumference of a
wheel.”107 To the extent that Flook had made a discovery, it
was not a discovery that the law allowed him to patent.108
Diehr, the final case of the trilogy, had a different outcome.
Diehr devised an improved process for molding synthetic rubber.109 In order to determine the optimum time to stop the curing process, Diehr continuously measured temperatures inside
the mold and used the data in a mathematical algorithm based
99. Id.
100. Id. at 585–86, 588.
101. See id. at 586.
102. See id. at 594–96.
103. Id. at 589 (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75
(1853)).
104. Id. at 589.
105. Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1272 (Exch.).
106. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 592.
107. Id. at 595.
108. See id. at 593 (“The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot
be patented rests . . . on the more fundamental understanding that they [natural phenomena] are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted
to protect.”).
109. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
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on the well-known Arrhenius equation.110 When the calculated
ideal matched the cure time that had elapsed, a signal from the
computer directed the opening of the mold.111 The Court held
Diehr’s claims to be patentable subject matter.112 It distinguished Flook on the narrow ground that Flook’s claims, like
Benson’s, ended with the calculation of a number (Flook’s
alarm limit).113 In contrast, Diehr claimed an industrial process
of curing rubber, one part of which happened to employ mathematics.114 A process of curing rubber is, unquestionably, patentable subject matter.115
Diehr differs substantially from Flook in its approach to
the interaction between the patentable-subject-matter requirement of § 101 and the novelty requirement of § 102.116
However, Diehr reaffirmed the essential rules laid out in the
previous century, even if it applied them differently than the
Court had in Flook.117 Section 101, broad as it is, excludes
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”118 A
principle in the abstract is a “fundamental truth” to which no
one can claim exclusive rights.119 If there is a patentable invention to be derived from the discovery of a principle, “it must
come from the application of the law of nature to a new and
useful end.”120 In subsequent cases, the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals, which usually takes a broad view of patentable subject matter,121 has also acknowledged the unpatentability of
natural laws or principles in the abstract.122

110. Id. at 178.
111. Id. at 179.
112. Id. at 191–92.
113. Id. at 186–87.
114. Id. at 187.
115. See id. at 191–92.
116. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of § 102.
117. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185–87.
118. Id. at 185.
119. Id. (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174 (1853)).
120. Id. at 188 n.11 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
121. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the traditional business methods
exception to patentable subject matter).
122. See, e.g., id. at 1373 (“The Supreme Court has identified three categories of subject matter that are unpatentable, namely ‘laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas.’” (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185)).
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2. Natural Phenomena in Their Natural State
A different question is whether one can patent concrete
things discovered in nature—such as naturally occurring substances, organisms, or occurrences. Ex parte Latimer,123 one of
the early cases to address the issue, refused a patent on the fibers extracted, essentially unchanged,124 from the needles of
Pinus australis.125 The Commissioner of Patents compared extracting the fibers from pine needles to “gather[ing] the pebbles
along the seashore, where the forces of nature have placed
them.”126 Even if the applicant were first to appreciate the useful qualities of the needles, this did not entitle him to a patent
monopoly. Patents that embrace “the trees of the forest and the
plants of the earth” would be “unreasonable and impossible.”127
Today, when we are accustomed to patents on plants,128
bacteria,129 and higher organisms,130 rights to the trees of the
forest and the plants of the earth do not seem so impossible.
Yet the principle of Latimer remains sound. It is sustained not
by the distinction between the living and the inanimate, but by
the distinction “between products of nature, whether living or
not, and human-made inventions.”131 Modern science allows researchers to modify nature in subtle ways, but it is only in that
modified form that the products of nature may be patented.
Even if it qualifies as a discovery to reveal in nature a substance, plant, or organism previously unknown, such discoveries are not patentable subject matter.132 The applicant
123. Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123.
124. Id. at 125 (“Nature made them so and not the process by which they
are taken from the leaf or needle.”).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 126. The discovery of an entirely new species would also fail to
qualify as a patentable discovery. See id. at 127 (“I am not aware of any instance in which it has been held that a natural product is the subject of a patent, although it may have existed from creation without being discovered.”).
128. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124,
127 (2001) (holding that plants are patentable subject matter under § 101).
129. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (stating that
bacteria qualify as “manufacture[s]” and “composition[s] of matter” under
§ 101).
130. In 1988, the Patent Office allowed Harvard University researchers to
patent a mouse genetically engineered to be susceptible to cancer. See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984).
131. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 130 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313).
132. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (“[A] new mineral discovered in the
earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.”).
Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit may hold a contrary view. See Schering
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in Diamond v. Chakrabarty prevailed because his hydrocarbonmetabolizing bacteria had been engineered in the laboratory.133
In contrast, the applicant in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.134 failed because he had only combined species of
bacteria that already existed in nature.135 This combination fell
short of invention because it was “no more than the discovery of
some of the handiwork of nature . . . .”:136
The combination of species produces no new bacteria . . . and no enlargement of the range of their utility. Each species has the same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their
use in combination does not improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite
independently of any effort of the patentee.137

A researcher who discovered a new use for a naturally occurring bacteria might obtain a patent; a new use is the handiwork of the inventor.138 But the patent would cover only the
method of use, not the bacteria itself.139
3. Explanations of Natural Phenomena
No one who discovers a scientific explanation for an existing phenomenon is entitled to exclusive rights.140 In Flook, the
Court noted that Newton’s expression of gravitational force as a
relationship between the masses of two bodies and the square
of the distance between them “always existed—even before

Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“It was and is well understood that an inventor may discover
something that already existed. . . . [A] previously unknown product does not
become unpatentable simply because it existed before it was discovered.”).
133. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10 (“His claim is not to a hitherto
unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture
or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive
name, character [and] use.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
134. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
135. Id. at 131.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., In re Schoenwald, 964 F.2d 1122, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
139. See id. (holding that an inventor of a new use for a known compound
is only entitled to patent the method of use).
140. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) (“A
claim covers and secures a process, a machine, a manufacture, a composition
of matter, or a design, but never . . . the scientific explanation of their operation.’” (quoting 6 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB’S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 21:17, at 315–16 (3d ed. 1985))); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that applicant is not “entitled to a patent [merely] because he sets out the scientific formulae [for] explaining what happens”).
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Newton announced his celebrated law.”141 The discovery of such
a relationship “carries with it no rights to exclude others from
its enjoyment.”142 In Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Pamlab, L.L.C.,143 the patentee discovered that antioxidants in vitamin supplements destroy vitamin B12 and folate.144 The patent claimed vitamin supplements omitting destructive
antioxidants.145 The court noted that B12 and folate compositions free of antioxidants were already known.146 The discovery
of their advantages could not deny the public the compositions
it had already used.147 Humanity had enjoyed the benefits of
fire long before understanding the role of oxygen in combustion;
the discoverer of oxygen could not have monopolized the use of
fire.148 Similarly, the patentee’s explanation of why antioxidant-free B12 preparations were more effective than others did
not entitle him to a patent.149
4. Inventions Incorporating Natural Phenomena or Based on
Natural Laws
Although natural materials or phenomena as such are not
patentable, one can patent inventions that incorporate them. If
it were otherwise, one could not patent any process involving
heat, any apparatus made of metal, or any composition formed
of atoms.150 Nature always supplies the elements of the patented invention; it is the use and combination of those elements that is inventive and patentable.151 For example, even
141. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978) (citation omitted).
142. Id. As a New York district court expressed it, “the Constitution grants
monopolies to inventors, not to analysts.” CTS Corp. v. Electro Materials Corp.
of Am., 469 F. Supp. 801, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
143. 412 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
144. Id. at 1321.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 1323.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see also EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
268 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (origin of the fire/oxygen analogy).
149. Upsher-Smith Labs., 412 F.2d at 1323.
150. See Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 1946). If one
could not patent a new molecule because “the inevitable result of the action of
so-called laws of nature which are immutable by man and remain free for the
use of all,” then no processes or machines could be patented either, because
forces such as gravity and friction always play a role; “[o]bviously, such an advanced position cannot be maintained in the face of the patent statute and the
multitude of authoritative decisions to the contrary.” Id.
151. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161–62
(4th Cir. 1958) (“All of the tangible things with which man deals and for which
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though Newton could not have patented his law of gravity, an
inventor could patent a machine that takes advantage of gravity to achieve a superior result.152 Similarly, inventors can apply
their understanding of natural laws to create new and patentable machines, processes, or compositions of matter.153 Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp.154 supplies a popular example. The patentee began with a formula expressing the natural relationship between the length and angle of wires in a radio transmitting antenna and the radio activity produced.155
The formula itself would have been unpatentable and, in any
event, had been discovered by someone else.156 The patentee,
however, applied the formula to create an antenna with the directional characteristics he desired.157 The design may or may
not have been inventive, but it undoubtedly qualified as patentable subject matter: “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel
and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”158 The patented antenna was a structure,
not a formula; it was an application of a natural principle, not
the principle itself.
C. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DENYING PATENTS ON NATURAL LAWS
AND NATURAL PHENOMENA
The rule against patenting nature denies monetary reward
to some of the greatest discoveries. Einstein,159 Newton,160 Fapatent protection is granted are products of nature in the sense that nature
provides the basic source materials. The ‘matter’ of which patentable new and
useful compositions are composed necessarily includes naturally existing elements and materials.”).
152. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 992–93 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Baldwin, J.,
concurring) (noting that Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.,
261 U.S. 45 (1923), in which the patentee improved a papermaking machine
by raising one end of the apparatus to improve flow through the force of gravity, “is often cited approvingly as an example of the proper use of a natural
phenomenon to produce a new and useful end result”), dismissed as moot sub
nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
153. See Dickey-john Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 348 n.9
(7th Cir. 1983) (“[A]ll inventions that work can be explained in terms of basic
truths.”).
154. 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
155. See id. at 92–93.
156. Id. at 93–94.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 94.
159. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“Einstein
could not patent his celebrated law that E = mc2.”).
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raday,161 Pythagoras162—even Prometheus163—could expect
short treatment from the Patent Office, because their “[e]pochmaking ‘discoveries’”164 fell on the wrong side of principle and
application. If the reason for having patents is to encourage
discoveries that benefit mankind, why deny patents to those
who contribute the most to the increase of human knowledge?
Why single out for reward “those lesser geniuses who put such
discoveries to practical uses”?165
The rule can produce results that seem both unfair and at
odds with the incentives rationale of patent law. In Morton v.
New York Eye Infirmary,166 the patentee discovered that inhalation of sufficient quantities of ether would make patients insensible to pain while undergoing surgery.167 He discovered, in
other words, the principle of anesthesia. The practical value of
the discovery can hardly be overstated, as the surgeons who
testified made plain: “[t]hey agreed in ranking it among the
great discoveries of modern times; and one of them remarked
that its value was too great to be estimated in dollars and
cents . . . . Its discoverer is entitled to be classed among the
greatest benefactors of mankind.”168 However, the court characterized this “benefactor’s” discovery as one concerning the natural effects of a known substance on the human body.169 That
one could operate on a patient rendered insensible by drugs illustrated the utility of the natural effect, but it was no invention of the patentee.170 He had not devised any new mechanism
160. See id. (“Newton [could not] have patented the law of gravity.”).
161. See Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944)
(“[T]he great discoveries of . . . Faraday could not have been rewarded with
such a grant of monopoly.”).
162. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“[T]he Pythagorean
theorem would not have been patentable . . . .”).
163. See Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 435 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank,
J., dissenting) (“No Prometheus is welcome in the Patent Office.”).
164. Katz, 145 F.2d at 961.
165. Id.
166. 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865).
167. Id. at 882.
168. Id. at 883.
169. Id. (“At this point the patent breaks down; for the specification
presents nothing new except the effect produced by well-known agents, administered in well-known ways on well-known subjects.”).
170. Id. (“The fact that the surgeon can operate upon the body in the condition to which it is thus reduced forms no part of the invention or discovery. It
simply furnishes evidence that it can be applied to at least one useful purpose;
a fact quite independent of the other elements necessary to make a discovery
patentable.”).
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with which to apply his discovery,171 so there was nothing he
could patent.172 A natural principle, such as the intoxicating effect of ether, could be the “soul” of an invention, but like a “disembodied spirit” it could not be subject to the patentee’s exclusive control until made concrete in a novel and tangible
means.173 The momentous character of the discovery did not
change the outcome, nor did it matter “what long, solitary vigils, or by what importunate efforts, the secret may have been
wrung from the bosom of Nature.”174
One would expect an incentives-based system to supply the
greatest rewards to the greatest discoveries, particularly when
“solitary vigils” and “importunate efforts” might otherwise go
uncompensated.175 A system that rewards only the last step in
practical application directs investments away from the place
where, in the end, they may show the greatest return.176 The
Morton opinion supplies few explanations, asserting at one
point that the unpatentability of such a discovery “needs neither argument nor authority to prove.”177
1. Legislative Intent and Constitutional Authority
One explanation might rest on the limits of congressional
power or the legislative intentions embodied in § 101 of the Patent Act. Although the Copyright and Patent Clause of the
Constitution refers to “[d]iscoveries,”178 they are the discoveries
of “inventors,”179 which may imply that only a limited class of
171. Id. (“This new or additional effect is not produced by any new instrument by which the agent is administered, nor by any different application of it
to the body of the patient. It is simply produced by increasing the quantity of
the vapor inhaled. And even this quantity is to be regulated by the discretion
of the operator, and may vary with the susceptibilities of the patient to its influence.”).
172. Id. at 881 (“It is only where the explorer has gone beyond the mere
domain of discovery, and has laid hold of the new principle, force, or law, and
connected it with some particular medium or mechanical contrivance by
which, or through which, it acts on the material world, that he can secure the
exclusive control of it under the patent laws.”).
173. Id. at 882.
174. Id. at 884.
175. Id.
176. See Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 455 (1969) (arguing that the patent system “would appear
to worsen . . . the allocation of research resources as between applied research
on the one hand and basic research on the other”).
177. 17 F. Cas. at 882.
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
179. See id.
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discoveries is patentable—discoveries that, through invention,
introduce into the world something that did not exist before.
Natural forces and phenomena already exist; only applications
of those forces and phenomena are “invented.” There is little
contemporaneous evidence, but this seems a plausible reading
of the constitutional language. Section 101 is potentially broader, in the first instance, by defining the class of potential patentees as “[w]hoever invents or discovers . . . .”180 The list of patentable subject matter that follows includes some things—like
processes and compositions of matter—that might be “discovered” existing in nature.181 In recent years, the courts have
treated the terms of § 101 in a broadly literal sense.182 On the
other hand, part of their authority for doing so has been the
statement in the Committee Reports that the patent laws could
extend to “everything under the sun that is made by man.”183
2. Altruistic Motives
It would hardly be satisfying to draw a statutory line between nature and patentable inventions without a rationale to
excuse the injustice to some of society’s greatest benefactors or
the paradoxical effect on the allocation of incentives. One justification is that higher interests than monetary reward motivate
the great theorists like Einstein and Faraday.184 Yet if scientists of Einstein’s caliber were indifferent to financial gain, it
would seem unnecessary to create rules that denied them patents they did not seek. Let us assume, therefore, that some of
180. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress employed. . . . Broad general language is not necessarily ambiguous when
congressional objectives require broad terms.”).
183. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, supra note 30, at 5 (emphasis added); H.R.
REP. NO. 82-1923, supra note 30, at 6 (emphasis added).
184. See Dickey-john Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 348 n.9
(7th Cir. 1983) (noting that it has never “been considered that the lure of
commercial reward provided by a patent was needed to encourage such contributions [as Einstein’s]”); Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961
(2d Cir. 1944) (“Interestingly enough, apparently many scientists like Faraday
care little for monetary rewards; generally the motives of such outstanding
geniuses are not pecuniary. Perhaps (although no one really knows) the same
cannot be said of those lesser geniuses who put such discoveries to practical
uses.” (footnote omitted)). Universities, where much theoretical research takes
place, may be less affected by the profit motive than other institutions. See
Turner, supra note 176, at 452.
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those great explorers of nature might desire, or need for covering expenses, the kind of financial returns that a patent could
provide. On the other side of the balance, one could argue that
the discovery of natural principles is not an activity valuable
enough to society to warrant monopoly interests; only those
lesser minds who apply natural principles to the “mundane
problems of everyday existence”185 actually enhance our material welfare. Clearly that has not been the reasoning of the
courts, nor would it represent a broad view of how discovery
benefits society, even in the most utilitarian respects. Moreover, it would be inconsistent to dismiss the value of a discovery
at the same time one protests limits on its exploitation by anyone but the discoverer.
3. Natural Rights
One could argue instead that exclusive rights to natural
phenomena or principles in the abstract, even awarded to their
discoverers, would impose too much upon the natural rights of
others. In a copyright context, one court called ideas expressed
in nature “the common heritage of humankind.”186 Similarly,
the Commissioner in Ex parte Latimer187 found that “nature
has intended [its products] to be equally for the use of all
men.”188 Even without personifying nature and giving it intentions, one can reasonably view nature, in its more abstract
forms, as a resource held in common by all. Jefferson, in a famous passage, expressed similar views about ideas:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an
idea . . . . That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the
globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement
of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all
space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in
which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation.189

Jefferson reasoned that ideas, and therefore inventions,
“cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”190 Nevertheless,
185. Dickey-john, 710 F.2d at 348 n.9.
186. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 2003).
187. 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123 (1889).
188. Id. at 126.
189. VI THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 180–81 (H.A. Washington
ed., 1871) quoted in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 8 n.2
(1966).
190. Id. at 9 n.2.
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Jefferson concluded that society, for its own benefit, might
grant exclusive rights to the profits arising from inventions “as
an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce
utility.”191 One could say the same of natural principles or phenomenon; they are held in common as a matter of right, but society for its convenience may award to the discoverers the profits derived from their useful exploitation. Why has it failed to
do so?
4. Novelty
Some courts supply the missing element by emphasizing
novelty—always one of the most fundamental considerations in
separating the patentable from the unpatentable. The benefit
of the inventions that patents encourage must be weighed
against the costs that patents impose on society. When a patent
claims novel subject matter, the trade-off is generally positive;
society can accept restrictions on the use of an invention that
otherwise would not exist at all. Nevertheless, if the patent
claims something that is not new—something that society already possessed—the costs of the patent are unjustified. That is
the reason that all patent claims must meet the standard of
novelty, embodied in § 102 of the Patent Act.192 In that provision, “[s]ociety, speaking through Congress and the courts, has
said ‘thou shalt not take it away.’”193
A phenomenon discovered in nature is not new, except in
the sense that it was previously unknown. In 1928, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held invalid a patent claiming a ductile form of tungsten, important because it could be drawn into
thin wires for use in electric light bulbs.194 Although the patentee, Coolidge, had been “first to uncover it and bring it into
view,”195 and although he had converted it from the impure
form in which it could be found in the earth, the property on
which he relied was a characteristic of the metal.196 “Naturally,” wrote the court, “we inquire who created pure tungsten.
191. Id.
192. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
193. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453–54
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
194. Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 641–44 (3d Cir.
1928).
195. Id. at 642.
196. Id. at 643 (“What he discovered were natural qualities of pure
tungsten. Manifestly he did not create pure tungsten, nor did he create its
characteristics. These were created by nature . . . .”).
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Coolidge? No. It existed in nature and doubtless has existed
there for centuries. The fact that no one before Coolidge found
it there does not negate its origin or existence.”197 More recent
cases extend the reasoning to scientific principles, like Newton’s laws of gravitation, that also exist in nature before they
are discovered.198
Section 101 does specify “new and useful” processes, machines, manufactures and compositions of matter,199 which bolsters the argument that natural principles or phenomena are
unpatentable subject matter. On the other hand, as discussed
in Part II.C, in other contexts the courts have denied that novelty, generally within the province of § 102, plays any part in
determining what is patentable subject matter under § 101.200
Moreover, the issue of dispossessing the public arises primarily
where the utility does not depend on understanding the phenomenon. In other words, it would be highly objectionable for
the discoverer of oxygen to deprive humanity of the use of fire,
but less objectionable for Coolidge to deprive humanity of the
use of ductile tungsten. Fire had been used successfully for
thousands of years; ductile tungsten had not been used at all
because its existence had not been suspected until Coolidge discovered it.201 Coolidge’s patent would not have “deprived [the
public] of any rights that it theretofore freely enjoyed.”202
197. Id. Today a court may well grant a patent on a purified form of a natural substance if that purified form does not occur in nature. See Schering
Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing In re
Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401–02 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). In such cases the subject
matter of the claim is novel.
198. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978) (citing PETER
D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 13 (1975)); see also Arrhythmia
Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1066 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Rader, J., concurring) (“A law of nature, even if a process, is not ‘new’
within the meaning of § 101.”); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(“The Supreme Court has recognized that scientific principles and laws of nature, even when for the first time discovered, have existed throughout time,
define the relationship of man to his environment, and, as a consequence,
ought not to be the subject of exclusive rights of any one person.” (citing Leroy
v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 155, 175 (1852))).
199. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added).
200. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981) (“The question
therefore of whether a particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from
whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.’” (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)) (emphasis omitted)).
201. See Gen. Elec. Co., 28 F.2d at 642–43 (“Coolidge took tungsten as it
‘existed’ . . . and by his process converted it into pure tungsten or tungsten
that is substantially pure, and, doubtless, was first to discover that when pure
it has characteristics . . . which are wholly different from the characteristics of
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5. Overbreadth
Another reason for excluding natural phenomena might be
that claims to such phenomena are overly broad. Much of the
value, and burden, of the patent monopoly depends on the
breadth of the claims. Narrow claims may be easily avoided;
broad claims may encompass large areas of economic activity,
casting a forbidding shadow over future innovations and increasing our reluctance to recognize exclusive rights. The objection to Morse’s claim 8 was primarily one of overbreadth.203
Covering any means for employing electromagnetism to transmit characters at a distance, even ones much different than
Morse’s own, it would have imposed too much on the “onward
march of science.”204 Benson relies on the same theme.205 Because Benson claimed his invention in terms of mathematics,
his patent would have covered a vast array of potential applications, including some not yet discovered.206
In comparison to an invention described as an application
of a natural principle, an invention claimed as the principle itself is a step further removed from any specific utility. It is by
nature more abstract and broader in scope. On the other hand,
the discovery of a natural principle might be considered a more
significant discovery, deserving of more substantial rewards.207
If Benson’s mathematics could be employed in so many fields,
the impure oxid of tungsten, notable among which is extreme brittleness.”).
202. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15 (citing PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW
FUNDAMENTALS 13 (1975)).
203. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–13 (1854) (“[Morse]
claims the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power is the
electric or galvanic current.”).
204. Id. at 113.
205. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (“Here the ‘process’
claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of
the BCD to pure binary conversion.”).
206. See id. at 71 (“It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in
practical effect that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD
numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case.”).
207. With some sense of irony, courts often contrast groundbreaking, invaluable, but unpatentable discoveries in natural science with humble, incremental, but patentable advancements in technology. See, e.g., Katz v. Horni
Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 1944) (“[The] plaintiff has
achieved a real invention . . . which satisfied the strictest standards employed
by the Supreme Court.”); Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 884
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9865) (noting that patents may be granted to “very
humble contrivances, of limited usefulness, the fruits of indifferent skill, and
trifling ingenuity,” but not to a discovery as “brilliant and useful” as anesthesia).
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perhaps his was a “broad discovery” meriting claims to match.
Broad claims, generally speaking, are not disqualified as patentable subject matter, though they must pass muster under
the enablement and written description requirements.208 Some
“pioneering inventions,”209 those that open up vast new possibilities, receive broad claims without demur. In any event, the
relatively brief duration of the patent term eliminates the startling prospect of Samuel Morse’s claim 8 covering such advanced technologies as fax machines and text messaging.210
Even if some advancements occurred during the life of his patent, subsequent inventors would not be powerless. They could
patent their own discoveries, after which anyone desiring to
practice the advancement would need the permission of both
Morse, the inventor of the basic principle, and the subsequent
inventor who had improved upon it—perhaps an awkward situation, but not an impossible one.
6. Tools of Research
Courts also warn against patenting the fundamental resources necessary for research. In Funk Brothers, the Supreme
Court described as “the work of nature” the non-inhibiting
qualities of the bacteria combined by the patentee, and found
that “[t]he qualities of these bacteria . . . are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.”211 In Benson, the Court held
natural phenomena unpatentable because “they are the basic
tools of scientific and technological work.”212 If patents are intended to foster technological progress, perhaps it would be

208. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”).
209. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The concept of the ‘pioneer’ arises from an ancient jurisprudence, reflecting judicial appreciation that a broad breakthrough invention
merits a broader scope of equivalents than does a narrow improvement in a
crowded technology.”).
210. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (providing the duration of a patent term).
211. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
212. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); see also Nippon Elec.
Glass Co. v. Sheldon, 539 F. Supp. 542, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying the “basic tools” language in a case where the patentee had discovered unsafe levels
of radiation emitted by some television sets).
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counterproductive to burden with legal restrictions the “basic
tools” necessary for research.
The same concern arises in the context of the utility requirement.213 In Brenner v. Manson,214 Manson developed a
process to produce a steroid similar to one known to have tumor-inhibiting effects in mice.215 Manson’s steroid had no demonstrated use, although it was a candidate for further research.216 The Supreme Court held this insufficient to satisfy
the utility requirement.217 An inability to patent the process
might discourage its disclosure, but “a more compelling consideration is that a process patent in the chemical field, which has
not been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility,
creates a monopoly of knowledge.”218 Like the monopolies
feared in Morse and Benson, it could encumber a boundless territory of further research:
Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a product
shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not
capable of precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and
perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power to block
off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public.219

The “basic tools” argument is dubious. As Judge Rader recently pointed out in a dissenting opinion,220 an improved microscope can be patented even though it is “tool of research.”221
No one knows what studies might be conducted with an improved microscope or what practical discoveries it might facilitate; microscopes are valuable because they bring researchers
“one step closer” to countless useful things.222 If patents on mi213. Section 101 states that a patentable invention must be “new and useful.” See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
214. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
215. Id. at 522.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 531 (“[Plaintiff ] begins with the . . . argument that his process
has a specific utility which would entitle him to a declaration of interference
even under the Patent Office’s reading of § 101 . . . . We do not accept any of
these theories as an adequate basis for overriding the determination of the Patent Office that the ‘utility’ requirement has not been met.”).
218. Id. at 534.
219. Id.; see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[I]n
addition to providing a ‘substantial’ utility, an asserted use must also show
that that claimed invention can be used to provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the public.”).
220. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380–82 (Rader, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1381 (“[T]he microscope . . . has ‘utility’ under § 101. Why? Be-
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croscopes were forbidden, one would expect fewer resources to
be devoted to their development, and advancements in microscope technology might be kept secret by those who could patent only what the instrument revealed. The effect would be to
deny researchers the tools needed for technological advancement—a situation inconsistent with the progress of the useful
arts. Similarly, natural phenomena, though not reduced to
practical utility, may bring researchers “one step closer.” Disallowing patents to natural laws and phenomena might withhold
necessary incentives at the very point where they are most
needed, while failing to protect those willing to share their discoveries. These points, raised by Justice Harlan’s opinion in
Brenner,223 failed to carry the day in the context of utility, and
presumably would not persuade the courts in the context of patentable subject matter.
II. PROCESSES BASED ON OBSERVING NATURE
The preceding discussion suggests that observations of nature turned to practical use—removed “from the laboratory of
the philosopher, and ma[de] it the servant of man”224—are patentable subject matter. But when applying a principle of nature means observing and drawing conclusions, additional issues arise, including the meaning of “process” in § 101 and the
status of “mental steps” as patentable subject matter.225
A. THE MEANING OF “PROCESS”
Section 100(b) of the Patent Act226 states that “‘process’
means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter,
or material.”227 Even when the Act referred to “arts” alone, the
courts viewed processes as patentable subject matter.228 The
cause it takes the researcher one step closer to answering . . . [important]
questions. Each step, even if small in isolation, is nonetheless a benefit to society sufficient to give a viable research tool ‘utility’ under § 101.”).
223. See 383 U.S. at 537–39 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
224. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132 (1854) (Grier, J., dissenting).
225. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
226. Id. § 100(b).
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722 (1881) (“That a patent
can be granted for a process there can be no doubt. The patent law is not confined to new machines and new compositions of matter, but extends to any
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courts struggled at first with the incorporeal nature of
processes as compared to physical materials. In Tilghman, the
Supreme Court drew the customary line between an unpatentable principle and a patentable application of that principle,
contrasting Morse’s claim 8 to Neilson’s hot-blast furnace.229 An
inventor, it held, could not patent an effect, but only a specific
“means” through which that effect might be produced.230 The
“means” might be a process rather than a machine.231 Processes
differ from machines in that a process is a fleeting series of
events—not, like a machine, an enduring concrete object.232 Because a process does not depend on specific machinery, a
process is something of an abstraction,233 but still capable of
serving as a patentable “means.”234
A few years before, in Cochrane v. Deener,235 the Court established the principle that new processes are patentable even
if they can be performed with existing machinery.236 The patentee’s process involved the separation and regrinding of “middlings” in order to produce high-quality flour. The most famous
language in the opinion is this description of a “process”:
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a
given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or
thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery.237

A process that “transform[s]” materials and “reduce[s]”
them “to a different state or thing”—like the grinding process
new and useful art or manufacture. A manufacturing process is clearly an art,
within the meaning of the law.”).
229. See id. at 724–27.
230. Id. at 728.
231. Id. The opinion includes a number of statements that are difficult to
fathom, including the observation that “[a] new process is usually the result of
a discovery; a machine of invention.” Id. at 722.
232. See id. at 722.
233. See In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 381 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (noting that a
process “is so far abstract that it is capable of contemplation by the mind apart
from any one of the specific instruments by which it is performed” (citation
omitted)).
234. See id. A patent claim describing a machine is also an abstraction—a
description of a class of machines that satisfy the claim language. By contrasting the concrete nature of a machine as an embodiment and the abstract nature of a process as an idea, Tilghman understates the abstractness of the
former.
235. 94 U.S. 780 (1877).
236. Id. at 787–88.
237. Id. at 788.
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that transforms flour from coarse to fine—has a physicality
comparable to that of an apparatus.238 It is not a theory, but a
material transformation. Some courts have implied that only
such processes are patentable subject matter.239 Others have
warned against misconstruing the language in Cochrane, first
offered to support an expansive view of what a process can be,
as a definition or limitation.240 In today’s environment of software and business method patents,241 a clear definition of
“process” is more important than ever. Contrary to the general
trend toward the expansion of patentable subject matter into
the realm of intangibles, in 2007 the Federal Circuit held that a
process satisfies § 101 only if “it is embodied in, operates on,
transforms, or otherwise involves another class of statutory
subject matter, i.e., a machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter.”242 A process not tied in such a way to a physical phenomenon, said the court, is an “abstract” idea, unpatentable
under Benson, even if it has a practical application.243 Benson
does not require a reading of “abstract” that would deny patents to incorporeal processes practically applied in the solution
of specific problems; the algorithm rejected as unpatentable
subject matter in Benson was not directed to any specific application, a point emphasized by the Court in rejecting the patent.244 Hence, the adoption by the Federal Circuit of this narrow definition of “process” is a surprising one, concurrent with
a similar shift in its treatment of mental steps as potentially
patentable subject matter.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., In re Yuan, 188 F.2d at 381 (noting that a process “consists
in the application of physical force through physical agents to physical objects”
(citation omitted)); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d
817, 821 (9th Cir. 1944), aff ’d, 326 U.S. 696 (1946), reh’g granted, 327 U.S. 812
(1946), opinion set aside by 329 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Meinhardt, 1907 Dec.
Comm’r Pat. 237, 238.
240. E.g., In re Prater (Prater II), 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1969). In
Benson, the Supreme Court added to the confusion. At one point, the Court
stated that “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or
thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include
particular machines.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972). Later, in
response to the argument that a process claim, not linked to particular machines, must perform a transformation, the Court employed this triplenegative: “[w]e do not hold that no process claim could ever qualify if it did not
meet the requirements of our prior precedents.” Id. at 71.
241. See infra Part II.D.
242. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
243. Id. at 1377.
244. See 409 U.S. at 71–72.
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B. THE MENTAL STEPS DOCTRINE
A further obstacle to patenting an invention based on observations of nature is the venerable mental steps doctrine.245
A series of cases in the 1940s established that purely mental
acts do not qualify as patentable subject matter. The court in In
re Heritage246 addressed an invention that consisted of testing
the amount of coating that could be applied to fiber boards
without impairing their noise-absorbing qualities.247 The user
of the method applied progressively greater amounts of coating
to samples of the board and selected the optimum coating based
on the results.248 The only novel aspect of the method was “the
mental process of making a selection,” which the court held to
be unpatentable subject matter.249 In Halliburton the patentee
devised an improved method for determining the distance to
the fluid surface in an oil well using reflected sound.250 The
claims used words such as “counting,” “observing,” “measuring,” “comparing,” and “computing.”251 The court found the invention, in essence, to be a series of mental steps, and unpatentable using the definition of “process” advanced in
Cochrane.252 The observations, computations, and comparisons
described did not transform any material substance into a different state or thing.253 Ex parte Toth,254 involving another oilfield invention, confirmed that mental steps “can be given no
patentable weight.”255
While the rejection of purely mental acts as patentable subject matter seemed unequivocal,256 at least two questions remained. One was whether a process that combined mental and
physical steps could be patented. A second was whether acts

245. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[6] (2006).
246. 150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A. 1945).
247. Id. at 554–55.
248. Id. at 556.
249. Id.
250. 146 F.2d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1944).
251. Id. at 821.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 131 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1944).
255. Id. at 132.
256. See In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (noting that it has
been “thoroughly established by decisions of various courts that purely mental
steps do not form a process which falls within the scope of patentability as defined by statute”).

964

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:933

that could be carried out either in the mind or by a machine
could be patented.
In 1951, the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) addressed the first question in In re Abrams.257 The applicant invented a process for identifying petroleum deposits by measuring the flow rate of certain gasses into
a bore hole and comparing the results to a benchmark figure.258
The applicant proposed three “rules of law” to settle perceived
confusion in the mental steps cases.259 Rule one stated that a
process is unpatentable subject matter if all of the steps are
“purely mental in character.”260 Rule two stated that if a
process includes some mental steps, and “the alleged novelty or
advance over the art resides in one or more of [those] steps,”
then the process is unpatentable.261 Rule three stated that if
some steps of the process are mental steps and others physical
steps, but the novelty resides in the physical steps, then the
combination is patentable subject matter.262 The rules “appear[ed] to accord” with the case law, but the court found it unnecessary to decide anything further than the applicant’s failure to qualify under proposed Rule 3.263
In the first Prater opinion264 of 1968, Judge Smith of the
CCPA challenged the conventional wisdom in several respects.
First, he cast doubt on the origins of the mental steps doctrine,
pointing out that in one of its earliest manifestations, the
claimed invention had failed the novelty test, rendering the
subject matter question moot.265 Second, he rejected the Cochrane definition of “process”—the surest ground for excluding
mental steps from § 101.266 When Cochrane refers to a process
as “an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subjectmatter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or

257. 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
258. Id. at 165.
259. Id. at 166.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 167.
264. In re Prater (Prater I), 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), reh’g granted,
160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 230 (C.C.P.A. 1969), opinion superseded by 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
265. Id. at 1387 (referring to Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58 (9th Cir.
1932)).
266. Id. at 1387–88.
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thing,”267 the court’s intention, said Judge Smith, was not to
limit what a process could be but to expand it beyond the confines of specific machinery.268 Third, Judge Smith dismissed the
Abrams “rules” as propositions without judicial sanction.269 If
the Abrams court embraced the rules at all, it was only for purposes of argument, to demonstrate that the applicant would fail
even if the proposed rules were adopted.270 Finally, Judge
Smith distinguished Abrams on the ground that the invention
in the earlier case included steps that could only be performed
in the mind.271 In contrast, the applicant in Prater I invented a
method of choosing certain peaks in a spectrograph to achieve
accurate measurements, and all of the steps could be performed
by machinery that the applicant disclosed.272 As far as Judge
Smith could determine, Congress had not denied patents to methods that might be performed, but did not have to be performed, in the human mind.273 The sole caveat was that the
method must be “directed to an industrial technology—a ‘useful
art’ within the intendment of the Constitution.”274
Judge Smith’s Prater I opinion was important but shortlived. The CCPA granted a petition for rehearing, and in 1969
issued the second Prater opinion.275 This time, the court rejected the claims as indefinite.276 An application must include
claims “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”277
Here the applicant regarded his invention as one limited to machines, but the claims failed to reflect his intentions.278 The
267. Id. at 1387 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787 (1877)).
268. Id. at 1387–88.
269. Id. at 1386.
270. Id. at 1371 (viewing the Abrams rules adopted by the court as a “misreading” of the case that leads to “confusion”).
271. Id. at 1389.
272. See id. at 1379.
273. Id. at 1389.
274. Id.
275. Prater II, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
276. See id. at 1396–97.
277. Id. at 1404 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
278. Id. Today this seems an odd use of the definiteness requirement. A
claim is indefinite under § 112 of the Patent Act if persons skilled in the art
cannot understand its scope. See Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. UA-Columbia
Cablevision of Westchester, Inc., 336 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Here
the court understood the claim perfectly well and found that it read on mental
activity. See Prater II, 415 F.2d at 1405. The claim might have failed the written description requirement if the applicant had not been in possession of such
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opinion duplicates portions of Judge Smith’s earlier efforts, including the warning against treating Cochrane’s process description as a limitation.279 Again, the court distinguished Abrams as a case in which the claimed process could only be
performed through mental steps.280 Although the court declined
to analyze the mental steps doctrine in detail,281 and much of
what it did say can be dismissed as dicta, the opinion marked a
significant shift. Because Abrams and the earlier cases predated the 1952 Patent Act,282 the court concluded that
“[w]hether or not a sequence of purely mental steps comes
within the bounds of ‘process’ . . . is . . . an issue which has never been squarely decided.”283
The retreat continued the following year with In re Musgrave,284 where the applicant invented a method of analyzing
seismograms.285 The Patent Office rejected the claims, finding
that mental steps were the only steps recited, or, in claims that
also recited physical steps, the only source of novelty.286 On appeal, the CCPA observed that nothing in the Patent Act specifically excludes, or includes, mental steps within the definition of
a statutory process.287 The case law it found “something of a
morass,” the term “mental step” having no clear meaning, nor
any definite legal significance.288 A physical process, the court
held, is not unpatentable merely because the human operator
must think, nor is a process to be performed by a machine disqualified because it might also be performed by a person.289 As
for the Abrams rules, the court found rules two and three to be
“logically unsound.”290 Whether a process qualifies as patentable subject matter cannot depend on where the novelty lies;
a broad invention when the application was filed. See Moba, B.V. v. Diamond
Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003). But the applicant in
Prater II seemed to have known all along that, theoretically, the method could
be performed mentally; it simply argued, unsuccessfully, that the claims were
narrower than that. See 415 F.2d at 1404.
279. Prater II, 415 F.2d at 1403.
280. Id. at 1401–02.
281. Id. at 1403.
282. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
283. Prater II, 415 F.2d at 1402 n.23.
284. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 888.
287. Id. at 890.
288. Id. at 890–91.
289. Id. at 893.
290. Id. at 889.
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otherwise, the subject-matter status of a process claim could
change as the art advanced, ceasing to be statutory when the
physical process steps ceased to be novel.291 “Logically,” the
court wrote, “the identical process cannot be first within and
later without the categories of statutory subject matter, depending on such extraneous factors.”292
If anything remained of the mental steps doctrine, it
seemed limited to methods that could only be performed in the
human mind, including judgments based on aesthetics, morals,
politics, or other “peculiarly human” values.293 Processes dependent on these judgments—a process for selecting the perfect
drapes for the living room, for example—might exceed the
scope of the useful arts. Rather than address these inventions
through the muddied lens of the mental steps doctrine, the
court devised a useful arts alternative like that proposed in
Prater I: “[a]ll that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory ‘process’ within 35
U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in
consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the
progress of ‘useful arts.’”294 This new test, Justice Stevens later
observed, “effectively disposed of any vestiges of the mentalsteps doctrine.”295 Judge Baldwin, concurring in Musgrave, argued that the new test was unnecessary because the “mental
steps doctrine” had been so limited by the courts296 that it was
“no longer a serious problem.”297
One factor marginalizing the mental steps “problem” was
that computers soon handled many processes involving calculations or comparisons. Hence, after Musgrave, attention shifted
to the “mathematical algorithm” analysis. In Benson the Court
noted that, theoretically, one could perform the calculations
with the aid of pencil and paper.298 But because Benson’s
process was meant to be performed by a computer, the discussion turned to the abstract nature of the calculations even if
performed by machines.299
291. See id.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 889 n.4.
294. Id. at 893.
295. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 200 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296. Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 894 (“[T]here is now only a very narrow scope
to this ‘fearful’ mental steps doctrine.”).
297. Id. at 894.
298. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
299. In dicta, the Benson Court did list “mental processes” as one of the ex-
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Another reason for the decline of the mental steps doctrine
may be that it was difficult to justify. In Abrams, the court did
not even try, declaring it “self-evident that thought is not patentable.”300 Leaving aside electrochemical processes in the
brain, mental steps do not transform any physical substance
into a different state or thing. Yet, as discussed in both Prater
opinions, Cochrane probably intended no limitation on the
meaning of “process,”301 nor, in any case, would a Cochrane limitation help us understand the reason for the distinction.
Some mental processes might fall outside the scope of the useful arts, but others are unquestionably technological.302 A
thought process might be considered a natural process, and
therefore excluded from § 101 like other natural phenomena.303
But novel mental processes are not found in nature; like any
other novel processes, they must be invented. While Benson includes mental processes, along with phenomena of nature and
abstract intellectual concepts, among the “basic tools of scientific and technological work,”304 the Court did not explain why
this is so. A process that requires only observation and reflection is not, necessarily, more fundamental to scientific inquiry
than a process involving physical steps. Finally, one might argue that legal restrictions on thought processes are inconsistent with basic freedoms, perhaps those guaranteed under the
First Amendment.305 This is an intriguing line of inquiry but by
no means well developed in the mental steps cases.
ceptions to § 101, perhaps signaling that the mental steps doctrine had life in
it still. 409 U.S. at 67. The similar list in Diehr includes only “laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 450 U.S. at 185.
300. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
301. See Prater I, 415 F.2d 1378, 1378–88 (C.C.P.A. 1968); Prater II, 415
F.2d 1393, 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
302. Some of the mental processes identified in Musgrave as “peculiarly
human” might defy description, raising issues of definiteness. See 431 F.2d at
893 (“Of course, to obtain a valid patent the claim must also comply with all
the other provisions of the statute, including definiteness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112. A step requiring the exercise of subjective judgment without restriction
might be objectionable as rendering a claim indefinite, but this would provide
no statutory basis for a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”). Many claims based
on mental steps would pose no such difficulty.
303. Cf. Prater I, 415 F.2d at 1388–89 (“[A]lthough appellants’ novel calculations performed in the mind of a man might possibly be considered to be in
nature, performance of the process of these novel calculations on a computer is
by ‘a means which had never occurred in nature.’” (citation omitted)).
304. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
305. See Prater II, 415 F.2d at 1400 n.20 (“The solicitor . . . argues that the
grant of a patent containing process claims of such breadth as to confer upon a
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Although the mental steps doctrine might have been considered defunct, it experienced an unexpected rebirth in 2007,
through the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Comiskey.306 The
claims of the patent application at issue, rejected by the examiner on grounds of obviousness, concerned a method of conducting a mandatory arbitration involving legal documents.307
Relying on the unpatentability of “abstract” ideas, as recorded
in Benson, the court held that purely mental processes, not tied
to machinery or the physical transformation of matter, are unpatentable subject matter, even if they are usefully applied.308
The court invoked the basic tools argument,309 and, interestingly, argued that such purely mental processes exceed the scope
of the useful arts.310 In other words, the “technological arts”
consideration offered in Musgrave as a substitute for a discredited mental steps doctrine has now been used to justify its reimposition. This development is certain to be controversial,
both because the intentions of the framers are difficult to apply
to the intangible technologies of today, and because mental
processes applied to the solution of practical problems in technological fields actually might be considered technological
processes, regardless of their incorporeal nature.
C. THE RELATIONSHIP OF NOVELTY TO PATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER
If “mental processes” are out of bounds, inventions based
on observation of nature may still be patented if allied with
physical steps preceding, or following, the observation. Because
such steps are often necessary to enjoy the fruits of the discovery, adding them to the claim is unlikely to limit the economic
value of the patent. As long as the physical steps in the expanded process are new, the mental component—observing and
patentee the right to exclude others from thinking in a certain manner would
run afoul of the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. He
urges that Article I, Section 8 must be construed in the light of the other constitutionally assured rights and that freedom of mind or thought may not be
abridged by the patent laws.”).
306. 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
307. See id. at 1368.
308. Id. at 1377 (“[M]ental processes—or processes of human thinking—
standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical application.”).
309. See id.; see also Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
310. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1374, 1378–79 (“[T]he patent statute
does not allow patents on particular systems that depend for their operation
on human intelligence alone, a field of endeavor that both the framers and
Congress intended to be beyond the reach of patentable subject matter.”).
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reflecting—should not affect the patentability of the claim; as
the court said in Musgrave, a process is not unpatentable merely because the operator must think.311 The problem would arise
if the physical steps were not new.
For many years there have been two starkly contrasting
views of the relationship between patentable subject matter
and novelty. According to the first view, one must identify, in a
claim comprising multiple elements, the particular elements
that distinguish the claim from the prior art.312 Only those
elements affect the status of the invention under § 101 of the
Patent Act. This is the approach suggested by proposed rules
two and three in Abrams.313 The other point of view holds that
patentable subject matter and novelty are entirely separate requirements,314 making it inappropriate to consider which part
of the claim is new, or if any part of the claim is new, when addressing § 101.
A patent claim is a combination of elements describing an
apparatus, method, or composition of matter. A product or
process that includes all of the elements infringes the claim.315
One could view the claimed combination as a whole as the patentee’s invention; alternatively, one could view the invention
as the advancement in the art—the “point of novelty”—most often recited in just a portion of the claim. Suppose, for example,
that an inventor discovered an additive that would keep the
graphite in a pencil from smudging. The claim might begin, “A
writing implement comprising . . . ,” followed by a list of elements, many of them old (a shaft of wood, a metal band, a soft
rubber eraser) and one of them new (a graphite rod with additive X). One could view the invention as the improved pencil or
as the additive alone, and one could construct a patent system
around either approach. Which system we have is a matter of
debate.
Section 101 reserves patents to those who “invent” or “discover” something new within the designated categories of patentable subject matter.316 Section 112 requires that the claims
311. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 892 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
312. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
313. See In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 166, 169 (using suggested “rules of
law” for the specifics of appellant’s claims).
314. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981).
315. See Techsearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (citing Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 532 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
316. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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“particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter that the applicant regards as his invention.”317 This suggests that the invention and the claim language are coextensive, and often claims include both old elements and new.
Section 103, requiring that a patented invention be nonobvious,318 is the one provision to hint that some claim elements
might embody the invention more than others. Section 103 focuses on the “differences” between the prior art and patented
invention, differences that might reside in only a portion of the
claim. However, the differences matter only if they render obvious “the subject matter [sought to be patented] as a whole,”319
a phrase implying that the invention is more than just the differences. Hence, as far as one can determine from the statutory
language, an applicant’s invention should be considered, for
most purposes at least, the whole of the combination described
in the claim.320 The language is not as clear as it could be, and
on other occasions courts have ignored the plain meaning of the
statute—for example, by excluding certain processes from
§ 101.321
Flook best expresses the view that one must focus on the
novel features in order to determine if the invention is patentable subject matter.322 The Court assumed that Flook’s mathematical formula was the only novel aspect of his method, something that Flook did not deny, and asked whether his discovery
of the formula made eligible for a patent his “otherwise conventional method.”323 Because only useful applications of natural
principles can be patented, “[t]he process itself, not merely the
mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful.”324 The
Court rejected, as “exalt[ing] form over substance,” the “notion
that post-solution activity [i.e., physical steps], no matter how
conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatenta317. Id. § 112.
318. Id. § 103(a)–(b).
319. Id.
320. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 n.16 (1978) (“Section 103, by its
own terms, requires that a determination of obviousness be made by considering ‘the subject matter as a whole.’ Although this does not necessarily require
that analysis of what is patentable subject matter under § 101 proceed on the
same basis, we agree that it should.” (citation omitted)).
321. See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating
that mental processes alone are not patentable).
322. 437 U.S. at 588.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 591.
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ble principle [such as Flook’s algorithm] into a patentable
process.”325 Viewed in this light, Flook’s claim “as a whole” included no patentable invention.326 Flook is a difficult opinion to
interpret, in part because of its ambiguous use of terms such as
“claim” and “invention.”327 Its clearest lesson is to test the substance of the invention under § 101, while ignoring any conventional process steps that might be added to the claim.
Judge Rich of the CCPA, and later of the Federal Circuit,
expressed the opposing point of view328 through his memorable
“three doors” analogy:
Achieving the ultimate goal of a patent . . . [requires] separate keys to
open in succession the three doors of sections 101, 102, and 103. . . . If
the invention, as the inventor defines it in his claims . . . falls into any
one of the named categories [of § 101], he is allowed to pass through
to the second door, which is § 102; “novelty and loss of right to patent”
is the sign on it. Notwithstanding the words “new and useful” in
§ 101, the invention is not examined under that statute for novelty
because that is not the statutory scheme of things or the longestablished administrative practice.329

Without overruling Flook, the Supreme Court in Diehr
adopted Judge Rich’s analysis.330 Which aspects of Diehr’s
process might be novel, if any, did not enter into the subject
matter determination.331 The claims, the Court held, must not
be “dissect[ed]” into old and new elements; the claims must be
325. Id. at 590.
326. Id. at 594. The Court found a distinction between patentable subject
matter and novelty. The Court assumed that the algorithm was novel, but still
rejected the claim for lack of a patentable invention. See id. at 588, 594.
327. See id. at 594 (“Here it is absolutely clear that respondent’s application contains no claim of patentable invention.”).
328. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979), dismissed as moot sub
nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). The Bergy court found in
Flook “an unfortunate and apparently unconscious . . . commingling of distinct
statutory provisions which are conceptually unrelated . . . .” Id.
329. Id. at 960. But cf. In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343,
1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that cancer-fighting properties inherent
in cruciferous sprouts are not the invention of something new, as required by
§ 101).
330. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981) (“The question therefore of
whether a particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.’” (quoting In re Bergy,
596 F.2d at 961) (emphasis omitted)).
331. Id. at 188–89; cf. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (1970) (“In considering the patentability of a process consisting of a plurality of steps we think
it is immaterial to the question whether the combination is a statutory
‘process’ that individual steps are old. The whole process could be old and yet
be statutory; a fortiori, it matters not that one or more steps are old.” (emphasis omitted)).
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evaluated as a whole.332 Diehr claimed his invention as a method of curing rubber—clearly, at that level, a “process” within
the meaning of § 101.333 Hence, whether or not Diehr’s invention was new, it easily qualified as patentable subject matter.
In re Comiskey suggests a change of heart by the Federal
Circuit. In Comiskey, the court held that “[t]he routine addition
of modern electronics to an otherwise unpatentable invention”—unpatentable in this case because, as a purely mental
process, it exceeded the scope of patentable subject matter—
“typically creates a prima facie case of obviousness.”334 In other
words, an invention barred at the door of patentable subject
matter but not reviewed for obviousness cannot supply the nonobviousness element of a combination that is, as a whole, patentable subject matter. The Diehr Court, one suspects, would
view that as confusing § 101 of the Patent Act with § 103. Nevertheless, any confusion in this case occurs at the § 103 “door.”
Because of this, and because Diehr was the Supreme Court’s
last word on the subject, one would still expect a process combining observation, thought, and physical action to pass scrutiny under § 101, even if the only novel aspects of the method
were, considered independently, unpatentable.
D. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER IN THE AGE OF INTANGIBLES
Recent decades have witnessed a remarkable expansion in
the subject matter one could expect to patent. One development
responsible for this trend is an increased deference to the applicant’s manner of characterizing the invention. Whereas the
Court in Flook looked behind the applicant’s claim to discover
its “substance,” ignoring any physical process steps if they did
not embody Flook’s contribution to the art,335 the Diehr Court
accepted the claim as written.336 On its surface, Diehr’s claim
described an industrial process for curing rubber—patentable
subject matter even if one requires that a “process” transform
physical materials into “a different state or thing.”337 After
332. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.
333. See id. at 184 (“[W]e think that a physical and chemical process for
molding precision synthetic rubber products falls within the § 101 categories
of possibly patentable subject matter . . . . Industrial processes such as this are
the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our
patent laws.”).
334. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
335. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588–89, 593–95 (1978).
336. See 450 U.S. at 191–93.
337. See id. at 182–84.
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Flook, one would have concluded that a mathematical algorithm cannot be patented, as a matter of principle, even if the
algorithm were usefully employed in a specific industrial context; Diehr reduced the issue to one of claim drafting.
A similar shift occurred in even more abstract areas of
computing, beginning with In re Alappat.338 Alappat invented a
method of producing smooth lines on a cathode-ray tube display, such as an oscilloscope, by shading the pixels according to
a mathematical algorithm.339 Alappat’s algorithm, like Benson’s, involved the manipulation of numbers. But unlike Benson, Alappat claimed his invention as a machine—an improved
display (or “rasterizer”).340 The claims described the machine as
a collection of “means” for executing the steps of the algorithm—each “means” consisting of conventional computer
hardware.341 The Federal Circuit, en banc, determined that a
reprogrammed general-purpose computer may qualify as a patentable apparatus, even if mechanically unchanged.342 Although the court fell short of holding that every algorithm
claimed as an apparatus qualifies under § 101,343 the form of
the claim occupied much of the court’s attention.344 Subsequent
cases followed suit. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signa-

338. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
339. Id. at 1537–38.
340. Id. at 1538–39.
341. See id. at 1538–39, 1565 (Archer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also 33 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function
without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”).
342. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 (majority opinion).
343. See id. (“[A] computer operating pursuant to software may represent
patentable subject matter . . . .”).
344. See id. In its concluding statements, the court observed that, “a computer, like a rasterizer, is apparatus not mathematics.” Id. Judge Archer deplored the majority’s “simplistic” approach. Id. at 1554 (Archer, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Every § 101 analysis, he wrote, “must begin
with this question: What, if anything, is it that the applicant for a patent ‘invented or discovered?’” Id. at 1557 (citation omitted). In that statement, Judge
Archer meant something more than “What does the applicant’s claim say?”
Judge Archer’s opinion in In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989), similarly
resists the idea that the claim alone determines the nature of the invention.
See id. at 839 (“[I]n answering this inquiry [what did the applicant invent?]
‘[e]ach invention must be evaluated as claimed: yet semantogenic considerations preclude a determination based solely on words appearing in the
claims.’” (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982))).
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ture Financial Group, Inc.,345 the patentee claimed a “data
processing system” for managing a mutual fund portfolio, providing centralized resources and tax advantages.346 The patentee invented no new hardware, but because the claim used the
“means” format, and the patent specification included general
references to computers, the claim literally described a machine.347 “A ‘machine,’” the court observed, “is proper statutory
subject matter under § 101.”348
Another striking trend has been the Federal Circuit’s emphasis on utility, rather than physicality, as the key to patentable subject matter. One could treat utility and patentable subject matter as entirely separate “doors,” to use Judge Rich’s
analogy, even though § 101 is the source of both requirements.349 A novel compound, for example, might qualify as a
“composition of matter,” but fail the utility requirement because its inventor had discovered no practical use for it.350 But
in a number of cases, beginning with Alappat, the Federal Circuit relied on the production of a “useful, concrete, and tangible
result” to establish that an invention is patentable subject matter, rather than an abstract principle.351
In State Street, the court applied the phrase to the calculation of mutual fund share prices.352 “Useful” the result certainly
was; anyone can appreciate the advantage of saving money
through economies of scale and tax avoidance. However, “concrete” is more debatable; the numbers were “concrete” only in
the sense that the computer calculated them to the last penny.
“Tangible” is a puzzle; the numbers had a definite meaning, but
if anything is intangible, in the usual sense of nonphysical, it is
data representing dollar amounts—symbols corresponding to
345. 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
346. Id. at 1370.
347. Id. at 1371–72.
348. Id. at 1372.
349. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); cf. id. § 112 (spawning the separate requirements of enablement, best mode, and written description).
350. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–30, 532–36 (1966).
351. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
352. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d at
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Today, we hold that the transformation of data,
representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces
‘a useful, concrete and tangible result’—a final share price momentarily fixed
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by
regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.”).
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an abstract medium of exchange. A contemporaneous case,
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.,353 also speaks of a
“useful, concrete, tangible result,” this time in the context of obtaining telephone billing information through Boolean logic.354
Here the court explains that physicality is just one way to demonstrate that the invention is more than an abstract idea.355 Although the Federal Circuit used the word “tangible,” utility
seemed to be the key consideration under § 101. As in so many
other respects, Comiskey marks a reversal. In that case, the
Federal Circuit held that mental processes alone are not patentable subject matter even if they are usefully applied.356 It
remains to be seen whether this signals a more restrictive application of the “useful, concrete, and tangible” limitation than
Alappat or AT&T would suggest.
The last important trend responsible for the expansion of
patentable subject matter has been the reluctance of both the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit to limit § 101 without
specific instructions from Congress. This has led to the demise
of some limitations that used to represent the conventional
wisdom. In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court announced that,
absent a definite signal from Congress, live, human-made micro-organisms would be considered patentable subject matter.357 Diehr applied the same approach to use of a programmed
digital computer.358 In State Street, the Federal Circuit held
that methods of doing business are not disqualified as patentable processes; they are subject to the same patentability requirements as any other process or method.359 The Patent Office has found that the Patent Act does not limit patentable
subject matter even to the technological arts—the “useful Arts”

353. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
354. See id. at 1358.
355. Id. (“The notion of ‘physical transformation’ . . . . is not an invariable
requirement, but merely one example of how a mathematical algorithm may
bring about a useful application.” (emphasis added)).
356. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he application of human intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not in and of
itself patentable.”).
357. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 314–18 (1980).
358. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
359. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived
[business method] exception to rest. . . . Since the 1952 Patent Act, business
methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”).
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in the Constitution.360 On the last point at least, it appears that
the Federal Circuit is pushing back. In Comiskey, the court
held that exclusively mental processes are beyond the scope of
the “useful arts” intended by Congress and the Framers, to be
the subject matter of patent law.361
Against this background, a technique combining observation of nature and useful physical action seems a plausible candidate for a patent. Such an invention is not one of philosophical inquiry, or a natural principle in the abstract; it is a
principle applied to practical ends. Because the claim will be
viewed as a whole for purposes of the § 101 analysis, it should
not matter whether the physical steps are old or new. Although
Comiskey raises doubts on that score,362 the Supreme Court’s
approach in Diehr should trump them. With proper claim drafting, the discoverer of any natural relationship usefully applied
might expect to patent the discovery—until recently. In his
LabCorp opinion, Justice Breyer cast doubt on the patentability
of inventions based on useful observations of nature.363
E. THE LABCORP OPINION AND ITS PREDECESSORS
Gathering information about the things around us can be a
matter of purely academic interest, but in other contexts information is a highly practical commodity. The fact that information is useful, however, does not overcome the § 101 problem if
one tries to patent the information itself. Some information,
such as the location of a petroleum deposit or the condition of a
patient, exists in nature; to reveal that information is not to invent it. On the other hand, one might invent processes or machines that take advantage of the information in a new way.
These should be patentable as natural phenomena usefully applied.
Many of the cases discussing patentable subject matter
deal with observations of natural phenomena. In Diehr, for example, the rubber-curing process depended on observing temperatures inside the mold and understanding the natural relationship between those temperatures and the condition of the

360. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1385, 1386–88 (B.P.A.I. 2005).
361. See 499 F.3d at 1378–79.
362. See id. 1378–81.
363. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct.
2921, 2926–28 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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rubber.364 One difficulty in such cases lies in separating the
phenomenon itself from the machine or process sought to be patented. When computers process the data obtained through observation, Benson’s mathematical algorithm exception adds an
additional layer of complexity.
Several cases involving observation and analysis of natural
phenomena for patient diagnosis produced mixed results. In re
Meyer365 concerned a process and apparatus, described in abstract terms, for testing the elements of a complex system and
correlating the results to identify a malfunction.366 An intended
use was as a computer-based diagnostic aid for a neurologist
running a battery of tests on a patient—an aid supplementing
the neurologist’s own memory and processes of deduction.367
The court determined that the invention was a “mathematical
algorithm representing a mental process,” divorced from any
physical elements or process steps.368 Without reference
to Musgrave, which had seemingly dispensed with the mental
steps doctrine,369 the court held the invention beyond the scope
of § 101.370 In re Grams371 similarly involved a method for testing the elements of a complex system and analyzing the results
to identify abnormalities.372 The claims limited the invention to
the diagnosis of abnormalities in human patients based on the
results of laboratory tests.373 Again the court found that the
analysis constituted nothing more than an unpatentable mathematical algorithm374 even when combined with physical
steps for gathering data.375 In contrast, the court in Arrhythmia
Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.376 held patentable
364. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–79 (1981).
365. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
366. See id. at 790.
367. Id. at 793, 795.
368. Id. at 796.
369. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
370. See In re Meyer, 688 F.2d at 795–96.
371. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
372. Id. at. 836.
373. Id. at 836–37.
374. Id. at 840–41.
375. Id. at 839–40. The court noted, “Given that the method of solving a
mathematical equation may not be the subject of patent protection, it follows
that the addition of the old and necessary antecedent steps of establishing
values for the variables in the equation cannot convert the unpatentable method to patentable subject matter.” Id. at 839 (quoting In re Christensen, 478
F.2d 1392, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
376. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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a method of analyzing electrocardiograph signals to identify a
patient’s susceptibility to ventricular tachycardia.377 In this
case, the invention was not too abstract for § 101 because the
inputs were “not abstractions; they [were] related to the patient’s heart function.”378 The output also was “not an abstract
number, but . . . a signal related to the patient’s heart activity.”379 Indeed, the method was one of physical process steps because it “transform[ed] one physical, electrical signal into
another,”380 potentially an argument for bringing any computer-implemented calculation into the realm of physical
processes.
The LabCorp situation is in some respects much simpler
because it does not involve a mathematical algorithm, nor an
invention described in vacuously abstract terms. The patentee
claimed a process for diagnosing a deficiency in two B vitamins
by observing in a patient’s blood an elevated level of the amino
acid homocysteine.381 Claim 13 read: “A method for detecting a
deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a body fluid for an elevated level
of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total
homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin
or folate.382
The district court, affirmed by the Federal Circuit, held the
defendant liable for inducing infringement by encouraging doctors to order the necessary tests.383 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the patent “claim[ed] a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship”—the relationship between homocysteine and the vitamin deficiency.384 Later the
Court dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.385 Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented.386
A successful patent policy, wrote Justice Breyer, requires
judicious balancing.387 Against the monetary incentives to inventors one must weigh the costs imposed on others; “some377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 1054–55, 1060–61.
Id. at 1059.
Id.
Id.
126 S. Ct. 2921, 2921 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2924.
Id. at 2921.
Id. at 2922.
Id. at 2921.
Id.
See id. at 2929.
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times too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”388 By raising
costs and interposing complex legal issues, patents can discourage research and the free exchange of information.389 One of
the ways in which patent law maneuvers between the “opposing and risky shoals” of overprotection and underprotection is
through the rules of patentable subject matter.390 The exclusion
of scientific truths and natural phenomena preserves from monopoly the “basic tools of scientific and technological work”—a
part of the “storehouse of knowledge . . . free to all men.”391 Because they are so fundamental, patents on natural principles
and phenomena, like copyrights on ideas, would create vast opportunities for rent seeking and enormous transaction costs.392
The law withholds patent protection even though discoveries
about the natural world may be difficult, expensive, timeconsuming, dependent on monetary incentives, and a “great
benefit to the human race.”393
Justice Breyer admitted that the line drawing can be challenging.394 Many patentable inventions begin with an understanding of the natural world.395 But this case, he found, was
not difficult.396 The relationship between elevated homocysteine
levels and deficiencies in colabamin and folate is a natural
phenomenon, and it remains so even when “packag[ed],” by the
claim language, in the form of a process.397 The process does
not “transform” the blood of the patient subject to the test; the
process simply requires the physician to “(1) obtain test results
and (2) think about them.”398 Moreover, even if diagnosing a vitamin deficiency could be considered a “useful, concrete, and
tangible result,” Justice Breyer warned that this language had
never been endorsed by the Supreme Court, nor, if taken liter-

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Id. at 2922.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2923 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2922−23 (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305 (2003)).
393. Id. at 2922.
394. Id. at 2926.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 2927 (stating that the invention in this case was “not at the
boundary”).
397. Id.
398. Id.
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ally, would it be consistent with Morse, Benson, or Flook.399 The
patentee’s attempt to restate a natural law in the language of a
process produced only “an instruction to read some numbers in
light of medical knowledge.”400 Justice Breyer called the correlation between homocysteine and the vitamin deficiency a
“natural phenomenon” and found “nothing in claim 13 that
adds anything more of significance.”401
With all respect to Justice Breyer, the situation was more
complicated than he admitted, for three reasons. First, the step
of “assaying” implies a physical process. Even if the process is
not new or patentable, Diehr suggests that it cannot be ignored;
rather, the claim must be viewed “as a whole,” and the inclusion of some steps that might, by themselves, be nonstatutory
does not change the character of the overall process under
§ 101.402 Second, the claim does not describe the natural relationship between homocysteine and vitamins per se, but a way
of applying the natural relationship to diagnose the condition of
a patient. It is overlooking a great deal to say simply that claim
13 “amount[s] to a simple natural correlation.”403
Finally, the justifications that Justice Breyer provides for
the exclusion of patents on natural principles have little force
as applied to claim 13. A patent that claimed the law of gravity
would be of enormous scope because gravity is operative in so
many contexts. Even a patent on the natural relationship between homocysteine and certain B vitamins could cover a “basic
tool of research,” if we imagine that the relationship might be
employed in medical treatments, improved vitamin supplements, or tests for related conditions. Indeed, one could generalize so far as to say that any natural principle or phenomenon
is a “basic tool of research.” But here the claim applies the rela399. Id. at 2928. If one took “tangible” literally, the standard would be consistent with Flook and Benson. In each case the result of the process was a
number—an intangible thing—and the Court denied the patent. Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). In
Morse, the description of the invention in the broadest, vaguest claim was less
than “concrete.” O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). The cases
where a literal reading of “useful, concrete and tangible” actually seems inconsistent with the result are some of the very cases relying on the phrase. See,
e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
400. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2928.
401. Id.
402. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
403. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2928.
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tionship to a specific purpose—diagnosing a vitamin deficiency.404 Diagnosis might be important to research; obviously it is
important to patient care. The patent might raise the costs of
health care, limit the use of an important technique, encourage
rent seeking, encumber physicians with legal problems and
transaction costs, and all the rest. However, compare claim 13
to a hypothetical patent on a medical imaging device, like a
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. MRI scanners
have at least the same potential as tools of research, if not
more, and they make enormous contributions to healthcare. A
patent on the scanner would carry the same kinds of penalties
as a patent on the method of diagnosis. Yet there is no question
that an MRI scanner would qualify as patentable subject matter under § 101, and it is unlikely that Justice Breyer would
find a patent on a scanner objectionable as a matter of policy.
In short, generalizing that seems plausible, if unproven, when
comparing natural laws in the abstract to machinery and other
applications of natural laws—the first “basic tools of research”
and the latter patentable inventions—no longer holds once the
natural law is applied in a form that yields useful information
and a specific beneficial result.405 There is no reason to suppose
that the usual weighing of incentives against costs produces
here a result uncharacteristically adverse to the progress of the
useful arts.
III. DANGEROUS KNOWLEDGE AND
ITS ECONOMIC EFFECTS
One thing does distinguish claim 13 from most patent
claims: the role that knowledge plays in carrying out the
process. Once a physician learns of the natural relationship between elevated levels of homocysteine and vitamin deficiencies,
that physician, on reviewing a lab report, cannot help but correlate the result and the likely condition of the patient. In a
process having only two steps, step one is unpatentable and
step two would “occur automatically in the mind of any competent physician.”406 This is a serious problem, having little to do
404. Id. at 2921.
405. See N. Scott Pierce, A New Day Yesterday: Benefit as the Foundation
and Limit of Exclusive Rights in Patent Law, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 373, 450−51 (2007) (arguing that a diagnosis based on elevated levels
of homocysteine is not a natural phenomenon but a novel technique with a
specific benefit).
406. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2924.
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with whether the process of diagnosis is a phenomenon of nature or a basic tool of research. Usually, potential infringers, no
matter how tempted they may be to adopt the advancements
discovered by the patentee, can choose to avoid them. Rather
than suffer the costs of a patent license or the risk of litigation,
they can elect to practice techniques in the public domain—
perhaps those revealed in expired patents, or those of inventors
who forfeited the right to obtain a patent. But physicians who
choose to avoid claim 13 may have no such choice, beyond abandoning blood tests altogether—a harsh alternative indeed.
None of the cases on patentable subject matter, even those
dealing with “mental steps,” pose this issue of the unwilling infringer paralyzed by the burden of knowledge. But the situation
is comparable to one that arises in trade secret law, known as
“inevitable disclosure.”
A. INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
Trade secret law is a branch of intellectual property governed, in civil cases, by state and common law.407 It protects
information that is valuable to a business because it is not generally known.408 One can misappropriate a trade secret by using or disclosing confidential information contrary to a legal
duty.409 Employees generally have a duty toward their employers, even after they leave employment, to refrain from using
trade secret information. The deliberate use of the trade secrets
of a first employer for the benefit of a second is, therefore, a
clear instance of misappropriation. The most difficult cases
arise when the very nature of the employment makes avoiding
use of the first employer’s trade secrets impossible. PepsiCo v.
Redmond supplies the best-known example of the “inevitable
disclosure” phenomenon.410 Redmond, a high-level executive of
PepsiCo, resigned to take employment at Quaker Oats Co.,
which at the time was a PepsiCo rival in the markets for sports
407. Most states have adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005 & Supp.
2008).
408. See id. § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). The subject matter of trade secret
law overlaps with the subject matter of patent law; a product formula, for example, might be protected as a trade secret or as a patented invention. It cannot be both, however, because one of the obligations of a patentee is to disclose
the invention in detail through the patent specification, after which the information loses its status as a secret.
409. See id. § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 537.
410. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
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drinks and “new age” beverages.411 While employed by PepsiCo,
Redmond had been exposed to detailed marketing plans and
competitive strategy.412 The court enjoined Redmond not only
from disclosing PepsiCo’s trade secrets but also from immediately assuming his new position.413 Even though Redmond
had signed a confidentiality agreement with PepsiCo and no
breach of that agreement had yet taken place, PepsiCo “[found]
itself in the position of a coach, one of whose players has left,
playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before the big
game.”414 Even with good intentions, it would have been impossible for Redmond to ignore the things he knew about PepsiCo’s strategy while performing similar duties for Quaker.
PepsiCo is a controversial decision. A leading treatise on
trade secret law denounces the “mischief”415 it is said to have
created. Some courts have expressly rejected PepsiCo’s concept
of inevitable disclosure.416 The source of the controversy lies in
the conflicting interests of trade secret protection and employee
mobility. Employers have a legitimate interest in protecting
their trade secrets—an interest that society must recognize if
businesses are to invest in developing proprietary information.417 Employees, on the other hand, should not be “shackled”
to an employer because they have been exposed to trade secrets, nor should they be prevented from assuming elsewhere
the positions for which they are best suited and trained.418 Inevitable-disclosure theories limit individual freedom, weaken
employee bargaining power, and harm society through diminished competition.419 In some states, concerns over employee
mobility have led to severe restrictions on contractual covenants that limit postemployment opportunities.420 At least
411. Id. at 1263.
412. Id. at 1264.
413. Id. at 1272.
414. Id. at 1270.
415. 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 5.02[3][d] (2007)
(“The mischief engendered by PepsiCo is hard to exaggerate.”).
416. See, e.g., Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 281 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002).
417. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434−35 (Pa. 1960) (“Society as
a whole greatly benefits from technological improvements. Without some
means of post-employment protection to assure that valuable developments or
improvements are exclusively those of the employer, the businessman could
not afford to subsidize research or improve current methods.”).
418. See id. at 435.
419. Id.
420. See Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
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those covenants are the subject of bargaining at the outset;
some regard an inevitable disclosure restraint as equivalent to
a restrictive covenant imposed after the employment has
ended, without consent, and without compensation to the employee.421 Accordingly, even courts that do not reject the principle of inevitable disclosure outright may apply it “only in the
rarest of cases.”422
At a broad level, the concerns that animate resistance to
inevitable disclosure in trade secret law are relevant to a patent that a knowledgeable person, carrying out otherwise legitimate activity, cannot help but infringe. Physicians aware of
the relationship between homocysteine and vitamin deficiencies
would face the same difficulty as Redmond. No matter how
they tried to compartmentalize their thoughts, inevitably they
would remember what an elevated homocysteine level implies
when they observe it on a lab report. In fact, their dilemma
would be worse than Redmond’s. He could try to act as he
would have acted without knowledge of PepsiCo’s strategic
plans. The physicians would not have even that opportunity;
once they had observed the correlation, the infringement would
be complete.
Employee mobility and bargaining power would not be
threatened, but freedom and competition would be. The only
choice of a physician who wished to avoid patent liability might
be to forego the relevant blood tests. If these tests had important uses other than diagnosing vitamin deficiencies through
homocysteine measurements, the choice to abandon the tests
might make the practice of medicine impossible, or at least limit what the a physician could offer the public in competition
with patent licensees.

(“Once the term of an employment agreement has expired, the general public
policy favoring robust and uninhibited competition should not give way merely
because a particular employer wishes to insulate himself from competition. . . .
Important, too, are the powerful considerations of public policy which militate
against sanctioning the loss of a man’s livelihood.” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
421. See Whyte, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281 (“As a result of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the employer obtains the benefit of a contractual provision it
did not pay for, while the employee is bound by a court-imposed contract provision with no opportunity to negotiate terms or consideration.”).
422. Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (“[T]he inevitable disclosure doctrine
treads an exceedingly narrow path through judicially disfavored territory. Absent evidence of actual misappropriation by an employee, the doctrine should
be applied in only the rarest of cases.”).
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When trade secret rights are based on duties arising in the
course of a relationship, the parties to the relationship have an
opportunity to negotiate an arrangement of mutual benefit. Today, in jurisdictions that recognize the inevitable disclosure
principle, sophisticated employees might realize, at the outset
of employment, that a confidentiality agreement could later restrict their mobility. Understanding that, they could seek to
negotiate terms, including appropriate compensation. Patent
rights are not based on relationships and are not the fruits of
bargaining with potential infringers. A physician who learned
of the homocysteine/vitamin correlation might have no prior
opportunity to negotiate, and any negotiating that occurred after the fact might be in the form of “an offer one cannot refuse.”
In short, the policy arguments against “inevitable infringement” seem at least as compelling as those against inevitable
disclosure.
B. INEVITABLE INFRINGEMENT
The problem of the unwilling patent infringer can arise in
other contexts. In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex
Corp.,423 the patent concerned the substance paroxetine hydrochloride (PHC) used as an antidepressant. Originally produced in anhydrous crystals (without bound water molecules),
the patentee discovered a hemihydrous form (with one bound
water molecule for every two PHC molecules). In the new form
it was more stable, making it easier to package and preserve.424
Patent owner SmithKline argued that the defendant, even
though still using techniques previously used to produce anhydrous crystals, now inevitably produced at least trace
amounts of infringing hemihydrous PHC.425 Why? Because the
newly introduced form of PHC “seeded” the environment, introducing trace amounts of the more stable crystals into every
production facility.426 Fabrication of pure anhydrous PHC had
become virtually impossible, even using prior techniques, because no production facility could escape contamination.427 The
423. 403 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
424. Id.
425. Id. at 1335.
426. Id. at 1335–36.
427. See id. at 1336. The district court noted that “[I]f Apotex . . . built a
new plant in Antarctica where no hemihydrate seeds had ever been and
started manufacturing anhydrate there, and a depressed worker in the plant
dropped a Paxil on the floor, the result might be to seed the plant and make it
impossible from then on to produce pure anhydrate there.” Id. at 1358 (citing
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district court ruled for the defendant, fashioning an equitable
defense based on the role played by the patentee in causing the
infringement.428 On appeal, the Federal Circuit declined to endorse the equitable defense, finding instead that the original
production techniques, disclosed in an earlier patent, inherently produced hemihydrous PHC, thereby anticipating claims to
the compound.429
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gajarsa focused on the dilemma of the unwitting infringer.430 In his view, the “unusual
tendency [of hemihydrous PHC] to ‘appear’ even where it is
unwanted,” contradicted the public notice function of the patent.431 A patent should clearly define the scope of the grant so
that it can be avoided, and SmithKline’s patent failed to do
so.432 Even with every effort to manufacture only unpatented
anhydrous PHC, Apotex could not avoid infringing.433 Judge
Gajarsa found the solution to the problem in § 101.434 Hemihydrous PHC, as a synthetic material, was a patentable composition of matter when first created; however, it “reproduces” itself by natural chemical processes once released into an
environment where production of anhydrous PHC takes
place.435 He compared the situation to the release of a patented
organism let loose in the wild and spreading uncontrollably.436
Section 101, Judge Gajarsa maintained, invalidates any
“patent claim[] drawn broadly enough to encompass products
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1020–21
(N.D. Ill. 2003)).
428. Id. at 1342.
429. Id. at 1342−44.
430. Id. at 1358.
431. Id.
432. The meaning of the claim, however, was perfectly clear. It included
only four words, each having a definite significance to chemists: “1. Crystalline
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate.” Id. at 1349.
433. Id. at 1359 (“A paroxetine anhydrate manufacturer, such as Apotex,
could exert reasonable efforts to manufacture only products already in the
public domain, could direct its entire production process toward developing
only products that scrupulously respected all patent rights, and could nevertheless infringe because a natural physical process acting upon its legitimate
anhydrous product ‘made’ new hemihydrous crystals that Apotex then ‘sold’ to
the public.”).
434. Id.
435. Id. at 1360.
436. Id. at 1361. For an extended analysis of the problem of pollen drift in
creating unwitting infringers, see Paul J. Heald & James Charles Smith, The
Problem of Social Cost in a Genetically Modified Age, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 87
(2006).
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that spread, appear, and ‘reproduce’ through natural
processes.”437 Had his analysis been adopted by the majority it
would have been interesting to consider whether it applied not
only to spontaneously reproducing crystals or organisms but to
ideas.
Publishing the discovery that elevated homocysteine levels
indicate a vitamin deficiency, even through the teachings of the
patent itself, might be considered “seeding the environment”—
after which knowledgeable persons, even those intending to
practice the prior art, could not help but infringe. Thomas Jefferson once remarked on the tendency of ideas to spread uncontrollably, like a life-form released into the wild: “the moment
[an idea] is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every
one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.”438 Certainly the negative consequences that Judge Gajarsa feared
could occur, including “a widespread in terrorem effect crippling entire industries whose artisans learn that even their
best efforts to respect patent rights may not save them from
liability as inadvertent, inevitable infringers.”439 The notice
function of the patent might be, in Judge Gajarsa’s sense,
“meaningless.”440 On the other hand, while Judge Gajarsa identified notice as the critical issue, he relied on the “natural” character of the crystal reproduction to find the patent invalid under § 101.441 Is the spread of an idea a natural process? It might
be in the sense that it occurs spontaneously, but it is not “natural” in the sense that distinguishes non-human from human activity. Hence, Judge Gajarsa’s conclusion that “patent law does
not sanction the concept of inevitable infringement”442 might
require other support in the case of the infringing physician.
C. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THOUGHT INFRINGEMENT
As Justice Breyer observed, patents impose costs on licensees, potential infringers, and society.443 They can discourage
technological developments, distract researchers with complex
437. SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1361.
438. VI THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180−81 (H.A. Washington
ed., 1871) quoted in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 8 n.2
(1966).
439. SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1364.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 1361.
442. Id.
443. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings Co. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct.
2921, 2922−23 (2006).
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legal issues, and, by offering monopolistic returns, divert resources into rent seeking.444 As long as the benefits outweigh
these costs, patents, generally speaking, fulfill the constitutional mandate to promote the progress of the useful arts.445
The benefits to be expected from patents involving thought
processes or observations of nature are the same as for any
other type of patent. The grant of exclusive rights encourages
research, and the disclosures mandated by patent law contribute to the art when the patent has expired. The costs, however, might be significantly greater.
One of the perennial concerns of patent law is to confine a
patentee’s market power within its proper limits.446 A patent
only creates market power if products or processes covered by
the patent have such advantages in comparison to potential
substitutes that they can command a premium price.447 Inventions that have such advantages generate a greater than competitive return, which rewards the patentee for advancing the
art. However, patentees violate the law by extending their
market power beyond the intended scope of the patent grant.448
One example is an unlawful tying arrangement, which conditions the availability of a product where the seller has market
power (e.g., a uniquely desirable and patented television set) on
the additional purchase of a separate product where the seller
has no market power (e.g., an unpatented microwave oven).
The principle fear is that power in the market for the tying
product, perhaps lawfully obtained, will translate into market
power in a different market.449 Power in the market for television sets, for example, might be used to suppress competition,
eliminate competitors, and raise prices in the market for microwave ovens, contrary to the intentions of Congress in allowing the television set to be patented.
In some cases, a patent infringed by observing a natural
correlation would have similar effects. Assume for the moment
that the tests discussed in LabCorp could be used for other
444. Id.
445. See id.
446. See 6 CHISUM, supra note 245, § 19.04.
447. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1292
(2006).
448. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[A] patent owner may not take the property right granted by
a patent and use it to extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e.,
beyond the limits of what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.”).
449. See Ill. Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1286.
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purposes than diagnosing a vitamin deficiency. According to
Justice Breyer, “growing recognition that elevated homocysteine levels might predict risk of heart disease led to increased
testing demand.”450 To the extent that homocysteine tests to
predict heart disease are unrelated to the vitamin deficiency,
they are a service that physicians should be permitted to offer
their patients. Yet the well-informed physician could not help
observing the vitamin deficiency “correlation” when observing
elevated homocysteine levels on a lab report. Simply performing the tests would lead to infringement liability, without further voluntary action. Consequently, the patentee could, at
least theoretically, eliminate competition in the market for
blood tests unrelated to the patented invention.
The high costs of avoidance could be manifested in other
ways. Physicians who did not wish to give up homocysteine
tests altogether might investigate “clean room” techniques.
Clean rooms have been used in other contexts where demonstrating ignorance is advantageous.451 For example, a company
using a computer program based on unlawfully obtained trade
secret information might organize a clean room, staffed by programmers isolated from the misappropriated original, to create
a functionally identical but legally blameless substitute.452 Similarly, a physician who prescribed homocysteine tests for
heart disease might turn over care of the patient to other professionals who had never learned of the homocysteine/vitamin
correlation. Just describing such a process, however, suggests
its absurdity. For one thing, because the correlation is publicly
available information, it would be difficult to find a test administrator guaranteed to possess the necessary level of ignorance.
If such a person were found, the qualifications of that person to
provide medical care would be in serious doubt. If the test administrator simply returned the patient to the original physician with a recommendation to treat the patient for heart disease, the physician, inferring that the tests indicated elevated
levels of homocysteine, could not avoid “correlating” that result
with a possible vitamin deficiency.
Even if it were possible to avoid the patent by cultivating
ignorance, the result would be starkly contrary to one of the
450. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2923.
451. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir.
1992).
452. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 700
(2d Cir. 1992).
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overriding policy goals of patent law—to encourage the spread
of knowledge.453 Some of the conditions attached to the issuance of a patent require the disclosure of information.454 The
patentee must set forth a detailed disclosure sufficient to allow
any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention
without undue experimentation.455 In addition, the specification must disclose the best mode of practicing the invention
known to the patentee when the application was filed.456 Such
disclosures may be described as a part of the bargain that the
patentee makes with society—the disclosure of useful information in exchange for a period of exclusive rights.457 It would be
strange indeed if patent law encouraged ignorance of the very
disclosures that patent law demands.
Importantly, these problems would occur only if homocysteine tests had substantial noninfringing uses. If checking
for a vitamin deficiency were the only purpose for conducting
the test, infringement would no longer be involuntary and no
independent market would be threatened. It might still seem
odd that physicians could be barred from conducting an unpatented test, but this is not a phenomenon unknown in patent
law. Through the principle of contributory infringement, a patent owner can prohibit others from selling an unpatented
component of a claimed combination, if the component has no
substantial noninfringing uses.458 Even something previously
known can come under the control of a patentee—for example,
a known substance having no use except in connection with the
patentee’s discovery.

453. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) (“[O]ne of the purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions.”).
454. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
455. Id.; Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (arguing that experimentation must not be “undue”); Nat’l Recovery
Tech., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“The enablement requirement ensures that public knowledge is
enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with
the scope of the claims.”).
456. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
457. See Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation
and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return
for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209–10 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that disclosure is
a quid pro quo for the right to exclude others).
458. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
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The latter occurred in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm &
Haas Co.459 The patentee discovered that the unpatented compound propanil could be used as a selective herbicide in rice
paddies.460 Propanil had no other known use.461 Farmers who
purchased propanil from the patentee received an implied license to use it on their crops.462 Because rice farmers who purchased propanil elsewhere had no such license, other sellers of
propanil became contributory infringers.463 Even though enforcing the patent meant barring sales of unpatented propanil, the
Supreme Court held that the patentee’s refusal to license was
not an unlawful extension of the patent monopoly.464 The Patent Act, wrote the court,
[E]ffectively confer[s] upon the patentee, as a lawful adjunct of his patent rights, a limited power to exclude others from competition in
nonstaple goods. A patentee may sell a nonstaple article himself while
enjoining others from marketing that same good without his authorization. By doing so, he is able to eliminate competitors and thereby to
control the market for that product.465

That control was no more than the patentee’s due because
the market was entirely dependent on the patentee’s discovery.
Without it, no one would buy propanil at all. Whether the patentee chose to license farmers who used propanil or set itself
up as the only seller of propanil was a matter of indifference.
Similarly, no meaningful extension of the patent grant would
occur if the LabCorp patentee controlled homocysteine tests
having no use other than to detect a vitamin deficiency.
D. SETTING LIMITS
The dangerous patents based on natural relationships or
“correlations” are those one can only avoid (1) by ignorance, or
(2) by foregoing activity that should not be controlled by the patentee. The challenges lie in identifying those patents and in
finding legal tools to deal with them.
The obvious place to begin is with patentable subject matter under § 101, but methods of observing and correlating are
always “processes,” in a literal sense. They are not principles of
nature in the abstract; they are, potentially, ways to apply na459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

448 U.S. 176 (1980).
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id. at 201.
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ture for specific, useful purposes. And they are not, necessarily,
“basic tools of research” in a way that distinguishes them from
other patentable inventions. One could require that a statutory
process transform a physical substance, but this would be undesirable as a matter of policy if it prevented, for example, patents on useful (and technological) software inventions. A more
limited solution may lie in the revival of the until-recently moribund “mental steps doctrine.”466 The weakness with that solution, as with a more physical concept of “process,” is that one
might avoid the issue by adding physical steps.
Observing nature often requires physical process steps,
like “assaying” the blood of a patient to measure homocysteine.
Once such steps are added to the claim, the process as a whole
becomes a physical process. One cannot ignore the physical
steps because they are not new; to do so would be to confuse
novelty with patentable subject matter.467 But adding these
steps does not cure the basic problem. A potential infringer
might avoid liability by foregoing tests or assays, but possibly
at the cost of using the results of such tests for legitimate purposes—an overextension of the patentee’s monopoly. Courts
might ignore “data gathering steps,” as they have sometimes
done when judging the subject matter status of mathematical
algorithms.468 However, even if this were consistent with the
holistic approach adopted after Diehr,469 it would affect all correlation patents, including those that do not threaten undesirable spill-over effects. What distinguishes a “good” patent from
a “bad” patent is not whether the physical process steps are
merely data gathering, but whether the data gathering has any
purpose other than the one discovered by the patentee.
One also has to consider the effect of physical process steps
subsequent to the correlation—like administering vitamin supplements to a patient. Diehr dismissed “token post solution activity” in the context of mathematical calculations.470 Treating
a patient hardly seems a “token” activity, particularly if improved by observation and correlation. Indeed, one could speak
in a general sense of an improved process of treating a patient,
just as Diehr spoke of an improved process of curing rubber. If
the physical process steps occurred after the mental steps, one
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

See supra Part II.B.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
See, e.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
See supra Part II.C.
450 U.S. at 192 n.14.
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could avoid infringement by ignoring what one had learned—by
taking no action to correct the vitamin deficiency. Aside from
the ethical problem of deliberately withholding medical care,
attempts to ignore what one knows may prove futile. A doctor
might, like Redmond, find it impossible to continue at all. Neither § 101 nor the complex heritage of the mental steps doctrine provide tools to address this distinction.
Creative minds might look beyond § 101 for solutions. One
could argue that infringement cannot occur without volition.471
It can occur without intent,472 including infringement by persons who are unaware of the patent, but even the unintentional
infringer generally undertakes some action voluntarily—such
as choosing to make and sell an apparatus that might prove,
however unexpectedly, to infringe the rights of a patentee. A
patent that could be infringed simply by thinking permits not
even that degree of volition. On the other hand, choosing to
conduct homocysteine tests having both infringing and noninfringing uses would be a deliberate act. The physician conducting the test and aware of the patent would know that, inevitably, observing an elevated level of homocysteine would lead to
the infringing correlation. The infringement would not be free
of all volition, but the physician should nevertheless be protected for the sake of preserving the alternative use of the test.
Another possibility is an equitable defense based on the patentee’s role in causing the infringement. The district court in
SmithKline crafted such a defense based on the patentee’s responsibility for “seeding the environment,” causing unavoidable
infringement by those seeking only to practice the prior art.473
Similarly, a patentee who “seeded the environment” with knowledge might be denied an opportunity to enforce the patent.474
The difficulty with equitable defenses is that they are usually,
by nature, flexible remedies dependent on the circumstances of
each case. An equitable defense could not be used, like an invalidity defense, to strike down patents that should not be en471. See Heald & Smith, supra note 436, at 141−42.
472. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (“Actions predicated on direct patent infringement . . . do not require any showing of intent to infringe.”); Heald & Smith,
supra note 436, at 89 (“Patent law . . . is based on the concept of strict liability.”).
473. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1328, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
474. See Heald & Smith, supra note 436, at 142–46 (considering in the case
of pollen drift both volenti non fit injuria and unclean hands defenses).
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forced against anyone. Also, an equitable defense would provide
uncertain protection to potential infringers unless the circumstances for invoking the defense could be clearly defined. If they
could be so defined, and if they related to the nature of the patent rather than the circumstances of each infringement, then
an invalidity defense is a more attractive solution. Unfortunately, no existing invalidity defense exactly fits the bill.
The best answer may lie in the adoption of the following
principle: no patent claim may be enforced if infringement can
be avoided only by foregoing or modifying activity not reserved
exclusively to the patent owner. Activity reserved exclusively to
the patent owner includes both that which is claimed, and that
which has no substantial noninfringing use. This principle
might apply in some situations having nothing to do with mental processes—as in the case of genetically modified corn invading other cornfields.475 If the patented strain intruded on the
land of an innocent farmer left with no option but to abandon
the field, the patent could not be enforced. In the context of a
method claim applying observations of nature to modify a physical process (e.g., applying test results to modify a course of
treatment), the territory reserved to the patent owner would
include the process in its entirety and portions of the process
having no substantial noninfringing use. If tests had no object
except to perform the patented process, such tests would be
forbidden, just as the sale of a part useful only in a patented
combination is forbidden. But if the tests had other uses, they
could not be enjoined, even if the person who performed them
would inevitably apply the results in the manner claimed—not
by choice, but by force of logic.
Although this proposition does not fit neatly into any existing category of patent invalidity, it is consistent with the policy
of confining a patentee’s market power to the intended channels.476 The discoverers of important technological advancements would be suitably rewarded, ensuring that such discove475. See SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1361. See generally, Heald & Smith, supra note 436.
476. An extension of a patent beyond its intended scope may be the basis of
a defense of patent misuse. Some have suggested that suing farmers who, because of pollen drift, cannot avoid growing some patented crops would constitute patent misuse. See Heald & Smith, supra note 436, at 147. It would, however, seem odd to base a defense of patent “misuse” solely on making the
disclosures required by the patent statutes and suing those who infringe. In
the case of pollen drift, some potential infringers might be innocent and others
opportunists. In the case of “knowledge drift,” it would be hard to differentiate.
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ries continue. At the same time, patentees would not have power over activities unrelated to their advancements. Of course
controversy might arise over the existence of a noninfringing
use for any process of analysis. Scientific inquiry alone might
be offered as a substantial use, or one might worry that limiting tests in the absence of a noninfringing use would forestall
the discovery of such uses. These are legitimate concerns, but
the same concerns do not prevent patentees from controlling
unpatented physical substances, such as propanil, that have no
known noninfringing uses.
Another issue would be whether a potential infringer can
avoid completing the patented method. If the method includes
not just the step of drawing a conclusion, but physical process
steps governed by observation, avoiding those physical steps
will often be possible, even if one is reluctant to do one thing
when one knows there is a superior alternative. Patents often,
however, present potential infringers with this very dilemma.
An engineer who has read a new patent disclosing a superior
apparatus may be sorely tempted to build one, but knows that
the only choice is to adopt an unpatented alternative or secure
a license. What sets apart processes with a mental component
is the problem of compartmentalization, familiar from the trade
secret cases. If one is already treating a patient, and has obtained test results for legitimate reasons, how can one avoid
the influence of a patented insight? With the proper context
provided through expert testimony, courts should have little
difficulty in identifying the hopeless case and striking down the
patent that creates it.
Some predicted that Justice Breyer’s LabCorp opinion heralded a dramatic reassessment of the bounds of patentable
subject matter.477 Comiskey has vindicated such predictions already. If continued reassessment comes from the courts, or
from a Congress now deeply engaged in the possibility of patent
reform, recognition of the principle set forth above could establish, more effectively than vague prohibitions against patenting
“tools of research” or “principles of nature,” a system that rewards discovery, encourages the spread of knowledge, and confines the market power of patents within appropriate limits.

477. See Cynthia M. Ho, Lessons from Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 463, 464 (2007) (“The world of patentable subject matter may soon
be subject to a seismic shift.”).
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CONCLUSION
Although the language of § 101 suggests a simple inquiry,
the analytical complexity of patentable subject matter seems
inexhaustible. For more than a century, courts have struggled
to distinguish between patentable inventions and unpatentable
principles, producing an intricate and perplexing set of rules,
some still embraced and others apparently abandoned. Yet
even today fundamental questions cannot be answered with
certainty. The LabCorp opinion poses one such question—
whether one can patent a useful method that consists in observing and drawing conclusions, based on a newly discovered
natural relationship. Justice Breyer addressed the question
principally through the principle/application dichotomy, which
has long stood as a bastion against denying others the “basic
tools of research.” In fact, the danger of the LabCorp patent has
little to do with research, and the principle/application distinction suggests that the invention should be patentable. The
greater threat posed by the LabCorp patent and others of its
kind hinges on the role that knowledge plays in infringement.
Even well-intentioned competitors of the patent owner may
find infringement unavoidable, except by cultivating ignorance
or abandoning legitimate activity. This could supply the patent
owner with unintended and undesirable market power. Unfortunately there are no simple tools at hand to deal with this issue, demonstrating that even after many decades of wrestling
with patentable subject matter there is still urgent work to be
done.

